GR 179563; (April, 2009) (Digest)
G.R. No. 179563 April 30, 2009
BACOLOD-TALISAY REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, MR. MARIO GONZAGA in his capacity as President of Bacolod Realty and Development Corporation, AND MR. ERNESTO ALLEN LACSON, JR. in his capacity as Administrator of Bacolod Realty and Development, Corporation, Petitioner, vs. ROMEO DELA CRUZ, Respondent.
FACTS
From 1980 to 1997, Romeo dela Cruz was employed as an overseer at Hacienda Gloria, owned and managed by petitioner Bacolod-Talisay Realty and Development Corporation (BTRD). His duties included supervising laborers, checking attendance, reporting work hours for payroll, checking cargo, and selling and receiving payments for seedpieces and canepoints. He was also entrusted with farm equipment and property. On June 4, 1997, he received a June 3, 1997 letter suspending him for 30 days due to charges of payroll padding, selling canepoints without management’s knowledge and misappropriating the proceeds, and renting out BTRD’s tractor to another farm and misappropriating the rental payments. After 30 days, his wife received a July 3, 1997 letter terminating his employment. Dela Cruz filed a complaint for illegal suspension and illegal dismissal before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit, and the NLRC dismissed the appeal for not being verified. The Court of Appeals reversed the NLRC, finding that petitioners did not comply with the proper procedural guidelines for dismissal and ordered reinstatement with backwages. Petitioners elevated the case to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE
1. Whether the dismissal of respondent was for a just cause.
2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in giving due course to respondent’s appeal despite the lack of verification before the NLRC.
3. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the decisions of the NLRC and Labor Arbiter.
RULING
1. Yes, the dismissal was for a just cause. The Supreme Court found that petitioners established with substantial evidence that just cause existed for termination. The evidence presented included: an excerpt from the barangay council logbook documenting statements during a confrontation; affidavits from petitioner Lacson, petitioner Gonzaga, and other company officers; a joint affidavit from four workers (Federico Serie, Jonathan Quilla, Eddie Sausa, Roberto Tortogo) claiming payroll discrepancies; copies of payrolls with respondent’s signature; and affidavits from other witnesses attesting to respondent’s unauthorized sale of canepoints and rental of the tractor. These acts constituted a willful breach of trust, a ground for termination under Article 282(c) of the Labor Code. The Court noted that while two affiants (Sausa and Tortogo) later challenged their joint affidavit, the other evidence remained uncontroverted, and respondent had the opportunity to refute the evidence but did not.
2. No, the Court of Appeals did not err. Lack of verification is not a fatal defect; it is a formal, not a jurisdictional requirement. It can be corrected, and its purpose is simply to ensure the allegations are made in good faith and are true, not speculative.
3. The Court of Appeals correctly found procedural defects but erred in ordering reinstatement. The Supreme Court held that while the dismissal was for a just cause, petitioners failed to comply with the twin-notice requirement of due process. The June 3, 1997 letter was a notice of suspension, not the required first notice to apprise the employee of the cause and give him a reasonable opportunity to explain. The confrontation before the barangay council did not satisfy this requirement, as barangay proceedings mandate parties to appear without the assistance of counsel. Since the first notice was not complied with, the dismissal, though for a just cause, was procedurally infirm.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals was VACATED. A new judgment was rendered ordering petitioners to PAY respondent the sum of β±30,000 as nominal damages for non-compliance with statutory due process.
