GR 178835; (February, 2009) (Digest)
G.R. No. 178835 , February 13, 2009
MAGIS YOUNG ACHIEVERS’ LEARNING CENTER and MRS. VIOLETA T. CARIΓO, Petitioners, vs. ADELAIDA P. MANALO, Respondent.
FACTS
Respondent Adelaida P. Manalo was hired on April 18, 2002, as a teacher and acting principal of petitioner Magis Young Achieversβ Learning Center with a monthly salary of β±15,000.00. On March 29, 2003, she wrote a letter of resignation addressed to the school directress, Violeta T. CariΓ±o, stating it was “irrevocable” and effective April 1, 2003, due to personal and family reasons. On March 31, 2003, respondent received a letter of termination from petitioner stating that the position of Principal would be abolished as part of a cost-cutting reorganization and that her contract, expiring on March 31, 2003, would not be renewed. On April 4, 2003, respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of 13th month pay. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint, ruling she had resigned and her employment was for a definite period from April 1, 2002, to March 31, 2003. The NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter, ordering reinstatement and payment of backwages and 13th month pay. The Court of Appeals affirmed the NLRC decision.
ISSUE
The core issues involve: 1) the effectiveness of respondent’s resignation; 2) whether respondent was a permanent employee; and 3) whether the employment contract stipulated a fixed period.
RULING
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the Court of Appeals decision.
1. On Resignation: The Court ruled that respondent’s resignation letter did not become effective. A resignation must be a voluntary act. The facts showed the resignation and termination letters were dated and delivered in close proximity, creating doubt about the voluntariness of the resignation. The employer’s act of sending a termination letter on the same day the resignation was to take effect indicated the employer did not accept the resignation but was terminating her. Therefore, the resignation did not effectively sever the employment relationship.
2. On Nature of Employment: The Court ruled that respondent was a probationary employee, not a permanent one. For academic personnel in private schools at the elementary and secondary levels, the probationary period shall not exceed three consecutive school years of satisfactory service, as per the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools and DOLE-DECS-CHED-TESDA Order No. 1. Respondent had served for only one school year (April 2002 to March 2003). She could not be considered permanent as she had not completed the three-year probationary period.
3. On the Employment Contract: The Court ruled that the employment contract did not stipulate a fixed term. The contract’s failure to specify a duration in the space provided, coupled with its standard provisions, indicated it was not a fixed-term contract. The reference to a period in other documents was deemed an oversight. The contract was therefore one for regular employment, subject to a probationary period.
The Court found that respondent’s termination was illegal. The abolition of the principal’s position was not a valid ground for termination under Article 283 of the Labor Code (authorized causes) as it was not shown to be due to serious business losses or a legitimate redundancy program. Furthermore, petitioner failed to comply with the substantive and procedural requirements for terminating a probationary employee, namely: (a) making reasonable standards known to the employee at the time of engagement, and (b) showing that the employee failed to meet those standards. Petitioner also failed to prove that respondent’s termination was for a just cause under Article 282. The award of backwages and 13th month pay was sustained. However, as respondent was a probationary employee, reinstatement was not ordered; instead, she was deemed entitled to full backwages from the date of her illegal dismissal until the end of the probationary period.
