GR 178429; (October, 2009) (Digest)
G.R. No. 178429 ; October 23, 2009
JOSE C. GO, Petitioner, vs. BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS, Respondent.
FACTS
An Information was filed against Jose C. Go, a director and officer of Orient Commercial Banking Corporation, for violating Section 83 of the General Banking Act (RA 337, as amended). The charge alleged that between June 1996 and September 1997, Go, taking advantage of his position, willfully borrowed bank deposits or funds, either directly or indirectly, for himself or related companies, and/or acted as a guarantor for loans from the bank to others, facilitating loans totaling over Two Billion Pesos. The Information stated this was done without the required written approval of the majority of the bank’s board of directors, a copy of which was not transmitted to the supervising department.
After pleading not guilty and completing pre-trial, Go filed a motion to quash the Information. He argued it was defective because the facts alleged did not constitute an offense. Specifically, he contended that the use of “and/or” in charging him as either a borrower or a guarantor, or both, rendered the allegation vague. He also asserted the Information failed to state that his acts did not fall under the exceptions in Section 83, which permits credit accommodations to directors up to a certain limit.
ISSUE
Whether the Regional Trial Court committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion to quash the Information on the grounds that it was vague and that the facts charged did not constitute an offense.
RULING
The Supreme Court ruled that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion. The Information validly charges an offense. The use of “and/or” does not render it vague. In legal contemplation, “and/or” means the acts are charged disjunctively; Go could be prosecuted for borrowing, for acting as a guarantor, or for both. The allegations sufficiently inform him of the nature of the accusation to enable him to prepare a defense. The specific acts, dates, amounts, and the lack of required board approval are clearly stated.
Furthermore, the Information need not allege that the acts do not fall under the exceptions in Section 83. An exception that merely provides for a justification or excuse for an act that is otherwise punishable is a matter of defense. The prosecution’s prima facie case is established by alleging the acts prohibited by the first paragraph of Section 83βborrowing or guaranteeing without the written board approval. It is not required to negate the exceptions under the second paragraph, such as the allowable limit for credit accommodations. These are matters of evidence to be presented during trial. Therefore, the facts as alleged in the Information constitute a violation of Section 83, and the motion to quash was improperly granted.
