G.R. No. 177790 ; January 17, 2011
Republic of the Philippines, Petitioner, vs. Carlos R. Vega, Marcos R. Vega, Rogelio R. Vega, Lubin R. Vega, Heirs of Gloria R. Vega, namely: Francisco L. Yap, Ma. Winona Y. Rodriguez, Ma. Wendelyn V. Yap and Francisco V. Yap, Jr., Respondents, and Romea G. Buhay-Ocampo, Francisco G. Buhay, Arceli G. Buhay-Rodriguez, Orlando G. Buhay, Soledad G. Buhay-Vasquez, Loida G. Buhay-Senadosa, Florendo G. Buhay, Oscar G. Buhay, Erlyn Buhay-Ginorga, Evelyn Buhay-Graneta, and Emilie Buhay-Dallas, Respondents-Intervenors.

FACTS

On May 26, 1995, respondents Vegas filed an application for original registration of title over Lot No. 6191, Cadastre 450 of Los Baños, Laguna, with an area of 6,902 square meters. They claimed to have inherited the land from their mother, Maria Revilleza Vda. de Vega, who inherited it from her father, Lorenzo Revilleza. The Republic, through the OSG, opposed the application on the ground that the land was part of the public domain and not subject to private appropriation. During trial, respondents Vegas presented, among others, the testimony and Report dated January 13, 1997 of Rodolfo Gonzales, a Special Investigator of the CENRO-DENR, who stated that the land was “entirely within the alienable and disposable zone” and that no public land application was filed for it. Respondents-intervenors Buhays moved to intervene, claiming a portion of the land sold to their predecessors-in-interest by respondents Vegas’ mother in 1951. The Regional Trial Court granted the application for registration. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision. The Republic filed the instant Rule 45 Petition, arguing that respondents Vegas failed to prove the land was alienable and disposable because the evidence did not state the date when the land was declared as such. Respondents raised procedural issues, arguing the Petition was defective for not attaching their Appellee’s Brief and for raising questions of fact.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s grant of the application for registration, despite the alleged insufficiency of evidence to prove that the subject land is alienable and disposable land of the public domain.

RULING

The Supreme Court DENIED the Petition and AFFIRMED the Decision of the Court of Appeals.
Procedural Issues: The Court first resolved the procedural objections. First, the failure to attach the Appellee’s Brief to the Petition is not a fatal defect. The requirement to attach material portions of the record is discretionary, and only the duplicate original or certified true copy of the appealed judgment is mandatory. Respondents were not precluded from attaching the brief themselves, which they did in their Comment. Second, the Petition raises a question of law, not fact. The Republic does not question the probative value or truthfulness of the evidence but its legal sufficiency to support the conclusion that the land is alienable and disposable. This calls for the application of law to a given set of facts.
Substantive Merit: The core issue is the sufficiency of proof of alienability and disposability. The Court held that the evidence presented, particularly the CENRO Report and testimony, was insufficient under prevailing jurisprudence. For original registration under the Public Land Act and Property Registration Decree, applicants must prove: (1) that the land is alienable and disposable public land; and (2) that they have occupied it in the concept of an owner, openly, continuously, exclusively, and notoriously since June 12, 1945, or earlier. To prove the first element, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action, investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, or a legislative act or statute, reclassifying the land as alienable and disposable. The applicant must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. Mere certifications or reports stating that land is alienable and disposable, without stating the date or year of such classification, are insufficient. The CENRO Report in this case, while stating the land was within the alienable and disposable zone, did not state when it was declared as such. Therefore, it did not constitute conclusive evidence that the land was already classified as alienable and disposable at the time of the application or, more importantly, since June 12, 1945. Consequently, respondents Vegas failed to discharge their burden of proof.
However, the Court noted a significant procedural lapse by the Republic that barred a reversal. The Republic failed to present contrary evidence to rebut the CENRO Report during the trial. It did not present any certification or evidence from the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA) or other competent government agency to show that the land was inalienable. The OSG, representing the Republic, has the duty to present such evidence, especially when the applicant’s evidence is weak. By not presenting any contrary evidence, the Republic failed to substantiate its opposition. In land registration cases, the government cannot rely on the applicant’s burden of proof alone; it must actively oppose the application by presenting evidence to protect the state’s interest. The Republic’s passive reliance on the weakness of the applicant’s evidence constituted a waiver of its right to contest the application. Therefore, while the evidence for registration was technically insufficient, the Republic’s failure to fulfill its own duty to present contrary evidence precluded the Court from overturning the lower courts’ decisions. The grant of registration was thus sustained.