GR 176995; (July, 2008) (Digest)
G.R. No. 176995 ; July 30, 2008
PABLO D. ACAYLAR, JR., Petitioner, vs. DANILO G. HARAYO, Respondent.
FACTS
Respondent Danilo Harayo filed an ejectment complaint (forcible entry) against petitioner Pablo Acaylar, Jr. before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Dapitan City. Harayo alleged he acquired a 30,000-square-meter portion of land from the spouses Pablo Acaylar, Sr. and Zoila Acaylar via a Deed of Sale dated September 14, 2004, and took immediate possession. He claimed that on September 19, 2004, Acaylar, Jr., a son of the vendors, entered the property through strategy, intimidation, and stealth, cut grasses, gathered fruits, and pastured animals thereon. Acaylar, Jr. countered that he had been in possession of his parents’ entire property since 1979 as administrator, that the sold portion was not clearly delineated, and that a separate case for annulment of the deed of sale was pending.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petitioner’s appeal on technical grounds, thereby affirming the lower courts’ decisions awarding possession to the respondent.
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ dismissal. The petitioner’s Petition for Review before the CA was correctly dismissed for failure to comply with procedural rules. The petition did not attach certified true copies of the MTCC and RTC decisions, nor did it include material portions of the record to support its allegations, as required by Section 2, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. The Court emphasized that rules of procedure are indispensable for the orderly administration of justice and must be strictly followed. The right to appeal is statutory, and perfection of an appeal within the prescribed manner is mandatory and jurisdictional.
On the substantive issue of possession, the Court upheld the findings of the MTCC and RTC, which are binding in this Rule 45 petition where only questions of law may be raised. The lower courts uniformly found that respondent, as buyer, was priorly in physical possession of the specific property after the sale, and that petitioner’s subsequent entry constituted forcible entry. The ejectment case could proceed independently from the pending action for annulment of sale, as the only issue therein was the physical or material possession of the property (possession de facto), not ownership. The alleged recanting affidavit of Zoila Acaylar did not overturn the factual determination of prior possession, a finding not reviewable by the Supreme Court.