G.R. No. 175510 ; July 28, 2008
SPOUSES VICTOR VALDEZ AND JOCELYN VALDEZ, represented by their Attorney-In-Fact, VIRGILIO VALDEZ, Petitioners, vs. SPOUSES FRANCISCO TABISULA AND CARIDAD TABISULA, Respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners purchased a 200-square meter eastern portion of respondents’ land via a Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 11, 1993. The deed contained a provision stating, “they shall be provided a 2 1/2 meters wide road right-of-way on the western side of their lot but which is not included in this sale.” Years later, respondents constructed a concrete wall on the western side of the sold property. Petitioners, believing this wall blocked the intended right of way, filed a Complaint for Specific Performance to compel respondents to provide the 2.5-meter easement and remove the obstruction.
Respondents countered that the easement clause was vague and unenforceable as a definite grant. They argued the right of way should be taken from the petitioners’ own purchased portion, not from the respondents’ remaining land. They further asserted that petitioners had other properties with access to public roads and that a two-storey house already existed on the alleged servient estate location before the sale, making the promised easement impossible. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint and awarded damages to respondents, a decision affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE

Whether the provision in the Deed of Absolute Sale granting a “road right-of-way” constitutes a valid and enforceable voluntary easement that respondents are obligated to provide.

RULING

The Supreme Court DENIED the petition and AFFIRMED the appellate court’s decision, with the modification that the award of damages to respondents was set aside. The Court held that the disputed clause did not create a valid voluntary easement. An easement is a real right that encumbers one estate (servient) for the benefit of another (dominant). For a voluntary easement to be validly constituted, the law requires that the imposing instrument must clearly describe the encumbered servient estate.
The clause “on the western side of their lot” was fatally ambiguous. It failed to specify whether the right of way was to be constituted on the western portion of the lot sold to petitioners (which would be within their own property, negating an easement) or on the adjacent western lot retained by respondents (the true servient estate). This lack of a definite description of the servient estate rendered the grant legally ineffective. Furthermore, petitioners’ action was for specific performance to enforce a contractual stipulation, not an action to compel the establishment of a legal easement under Article 649 of the Civil Code, which has different requisites they did not plead or prove. Since the alleged grant was invalid, respondents had no obligation to provide the right of way.