GR 174569; (September, 2008) (Digest)
G.R. No. 174569 . September 17, 2008.
CHINA BANKING CORPORATION, SPOUSES JOEY & MARY JEANNIE CASTRO and SPOUSES RICHARD & EDITHA NOGOY, Petitioners, versus BENJAMIN CO, ENGR. DALE OLEA and THREE KINGS CONSTRUCTION & REALTY CORPORATION, Respondents.
FACTS
Petitioners China Banking Corporation sold subdivision lots to the Castro and Nogoy spouses. These lots are adjacent to Lot No. 3783-E, registered under TCT No. 269758-R in the name of respondent Benjamin Co and his siblings. Respondents, who were developing the adjacent Northwoods Estates, began constructing a perimeter wall on Lot No. 3783-E in 2003. Petitioners demanded they cease construction, claiming Lot No. 3783-E was a designated road lot that provided the Nogoy spouses’ only access and affected the Castro spouses’ ventilation. The demand was ignored.
Petitioners filed a complaint for injunction and damages with the RTC of San Fernando, Pampanga, later amending it to seek a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to compel the wall’s removal and the lot’s restoration. The RTC denied the application, finding petitioners failed to clearly prove a right to the relief or imminent irreparable injury. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC’s denial.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the denial of the application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.
RULING
The Supreme Court denied the petition and upheld the denial of the writ. A writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, being an extraordinary remedy, requires a clear showing of a right in esse (a right that is actual and existing) and a urgent and paramount necessity for its issuance to prevent serious, irreparable damage. The Court found petitioners failed to meet this stringent burden.
The core legal logic is that the trial court’s factual findings, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are conclusive absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion. The RTC, based on evidence including an ocular inspection, found: (1) Lot No. 3783-E was not indicated as a road lot in the relevant subdivision plans; (2) the lot showed no visible pathway and was overgrown; (3) the Nogoy spouses had even built a structure on it; and (4) petitioners had alternative access via another subdivision road and were not deprived of light or ventilation. These findings negated petitioners’ claim of an existing, established road lot right and any showing of irreparable injury. Since the status of the lot and the existence of petitioners’ claimed right were factual issues requiring a full trial, the lower courts correctly ruled that the drastic remedy of a preliminary mandatory injunction was not warranted at that stage. The petition was thus denied.
