G.R. No. 173870 ; April 25, 2012
OSCAR DEL CARMEN, JR., Petitioner, vs. GERONIMO BACOY, Guardian and representing the children, namely: MARY MARJORIE B. MONSALUD, ERIC B. MONSALUD, METZIE ANN B. MONSALUD, KAREEN B. MONSALUD, LEONARDO B. MONSALUD, JR., and CRISTINA B. MONSALUD, Respondents.

FACTS

On January 1, 1993, a Fuso passenger jeep registered to petitioner Oscar del Carmen, Jr. and used as a public utility vehicle ran over and killed Emilia Bacoy Monsalud, her spouse, and their daughter. The driver, Allan Maglasang, was convicted of reckless imprudence. An independent civil action for damages based on culpa aquiliana was filed against Allan and Oscar Jr., the registered owner. Oscar Jr. defended himself by claiming the jeep was carnapped; he alleged Allan, a former conductor whose employment ended on December 14, 1992, stole the vehicle, which could be started without a key, for a joyride. He presented witness testimony and a dismissed carnapping case to support this.
The respondents, represented by the victims’ father Geronimo Bacoy, contended Allan was still Oscar Jr.’s employee at the time of the accident, presenting witnesses who claimed to have paid fares to Allan in late December 1992. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) held Oscar Jr. subsidiarily liable, applying the principle of res ipsa loquitur, finding negligence in his failure to secure the easily-startable vehicle. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed but based liability on Article 2180 of the Civil Code as employer, finding Allan was still in his employ, and alternatively, on his negligence as registered owner under the Erezo doctrine.

ISSUE

Whether petitioner Oscar del Carmen, Jr., as the registered owner of the vehicle, is civilly liable for damages arising from the accident.

RULING

Yes, the Supreme Court affirmed the CA decision holding Oscar del Carmen, Jr. liable. The legal logic proceeds on two independent grounds. First, the Court found that Allan Maglasang was still an employee of Oscar Jr. at the time of the accident. The claim of terminated employment was contradicted by credible witness testimony placing Allan as the conductor collecting fares after December 14, 1992. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, an employer is primarily and directly liable for damages caused by employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. Oscar Jr.’s failure to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee rendered him liable.
Second, and alternatively, even assuming Allan was no longer an employee and had taken the vehicle without consent, Oscar Jr. remained liable as the registered owner. Following the doctrine established in Erezo v. Jepte, the registered owner is directly and primarily responsible for damages caused by the operation of the vehicle, irrespective of who the actual driver or operator is. This public policy is designed to protect the public from the dangers of motor vehicle use and to facilitate recovery for victims. Oscar Jr.’s own admission that the jeep could be easily started without a key demonstrated his negligence in securing it, which contributed to the unauthorized use and the subsequent accident. His liability is not merely subsidiary but primary and direct.