GR 173840; (April, 2012) (Digest)
G.R. No. 173840 ; April 25, 2012
SAMAR II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (SAMELCO II) AND ITS BOARD OF DIRECTORS, Petitioners, vs. ANANIAS D. SELUDO, JR., Respondent.
FACTS
Petitioner Samar II Electric Cooperative, Inc. (SAMELCO II) is an electric cooperative organized under P.D. No. 269, as amended. Respondent Ananias D. Seludo, Jr. was an elected member of its Board of Directors. On January 22, 2005, the Board passed Resolution No. 5, Series of 2005, which disallowed Seludo from attending Board meetings effective February 2005 until the end of his term in May 2005 and disqualified him from running for director for one succeeding term. Contending that this resolution curtailed his rights without legal basis, Seludo filed an Urgent Petition for Prohibition with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calbiga, Samar, seeking its nullification and the issuance of an injunction.
The petitioners, in their Answer, raised the affirmative defense of lack of jurisdiction, arguing that under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the National Electrification Administration (NEA) possesses exclusive authority over matters involving electric cooperatives like SAMELCO II. The RTC sustained its jurisdiction and barred the enforcement of the resolution. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC’s orders, prompting this petition.
ISSUE
Whether the Regional Trial Court correctly assumed jurisdiction over the petition for prohibition, or whether the doctrine of primary jurisdiction requires that the controversy be first referred to the National Electrification Administration.
RULING
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners and reversed the decisions of the lower courts. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies. The Court held that the NEA, by virtue of its charter (P.D. No. 269, as amended by P.D. No. 1645), exercises supervisory and disciplinary authority over electric cooperatives. Specifically, Section 10 of P.D. No. 269, as amended, grants NEA the power to issue rules, make binding decisions on complaints, and exercise exclusive jurisdiction over controversies affecting electric cooperatives.
The legal logic is that the dispute—involving the validity of a board resolution that effectively removed a director and imposed an electoral disqualification—is intimately related to the internal governance and discipline of the cooperative. This falls squarely within the NEA’s specialized administrative competence to regulate and supervise electric cooperatives to ensure their proper operation. The RTC should have suspended its proceedings to allow the NEA, the agency with the requisite expertise, to first resolve the matter. The existence of this plain, speedy, and adequate administrative remedy also precluded the immediate resort to a judicial writ of prohibition. Consequently, the case was remanded to the RTC with instructions to refer the matter to the NEA.