GR 173590; (December, 2013) (Digest)
G.R. No. 173590 ; December 9, 2013
PHILIPPINE POSTAL CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and CRISANTO G. DE GUZMAN, Respondents.
FACTS
Respondent Crisanto G. De Guzman, a Postal Inspector, was investigated in 1988 based on an anonymous complaint for dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the service. The investigating officer recommended formal charges. However, the DOTC’s Investigation Security and Law Enforcement Staff (ISLES), after evaluation, recommended exoneration due to lack of merit in a 1990 Memorandum, which was approved by the DOTC Assistant Secretary. Subsequently, the Postal Service Office was abolished and its functions transferred to the newly created Philippine Postal Corporation (PPC) under R.A. 7354 in 1992.
In 1993, the PPC formally charged De Guzman with the same offenses. He was found guilty and dismissed in a 1994 Decision. This decision was not implemented until 1999. De Guzman filed a motion for reconsideration, claiming the 1994 decision had been recalled. His motion was initially denied but a subsequent resolution in 2003 ordered a formal rehearing. After rehearing, the PPC, through a new Postmaster General, issued a 2004 Resolution finding De Guzman guilty and dismissing him from service. De Guzman challenged this before the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE
Whether the PPC, through its new Postmaster General, gravely abused its discretion in reviving and adjudicating the administrative charges against De Guzman which had been previously dismissed by the DOTC, the PPC’s predecessor agency.
RULING
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative, affirming the Court of Appeals. The PPC committed grave abuse of discretion. The legal logic rests on the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment and the principles governing administrative res judicata. The ISLES of the DOTC, which had original jurisdiction over the charges at the time, issued a final decision exonerating De Guzman in 1990. This decision was approved by the DOTC Assistant Secretary, the proper disciplining authority.
When the PPC was created, it merely succeeded the DOTC’s Postal Services Office; it did not acquire a new or separate disciplinary authority to re-evaluate a case already finally resolved by its predecessor. The 1990 exoneration constituted a final judgment on the merits. The PPC’s act of reviving the same charges based on the same facts, and conducting a new investigation and adjudication, effectively overturned a final administrative determination. This violated the rule against re-litigating settled matters and constituted grave abuse of discretion, meaning a whimsical, arbitrary, or despotic exercise of power. The PPC’s subsequent actions were void for lack of jurisdiction.
