G.R. No. 173365 ; April 15, 2010
JULIO FLORES (deceased), substituted by his heirs; BENITO FLORES (deceased), substituted by his heirs; DOLORES FLORES and VIRGINIA FLORES-DALERE, represented by their Attorney-in-Fact, JIMENA TOMAS, Petitioners, vs. MARCIANO BAGAOISAN, Respondent.

FACTS

Petitioners are the heirs of Victor Flores, in whose name Original Certificate of Title No. P-11880 was issued on November 12, 1973, pursuant to a homestead patent covering a parcel of land in Piddig, Ilocos Norte. On December 20, 1976, petitioners executed a Deed of Confirmation and Quitclaim over a 13,552-square meter portion of this land in favor of Vicente T. Lazo. Respondent Marciano Bagaoisan subsequently purchased this portion from Lazo in 1977. In 1996, respondent filed an action for ownership, quieting of title, and partition against petitioners, asserting he was the true owner and that the property had been erroneously included in the petitioners’ title, a fact petitioners had acknowledged in a subsequent affidavit.
Petitioners admitted executing the deed but claimed they were misled due to lack of education. They contended the deed was void for violating the five-year prohibition against alienating homestead lands under the Public Land Act. The Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondent, upholding the deed’s validity and declaring him the owner.

ISSUE

Whether the Deed of Confirmation and Quitclaim is void for violating the five-year prohibitory period against alienation of lands acquired through a homestead patent under Section 118 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 , the Public Land Act.

RULING

The Supreme Court GRANTED the petition, REVERSED the Court of Appeals, and DISMISSED the complaint. The Deed of Confirmation and Quitclaim, executed on December 20, 1976, is void for contravening Section 118 of the Public Land Act. This law explicitly prohibits any encumbrance or alienation of homestead lands within five years from the issuance of the patent. The patent was issued on November 12, 1973, making the deed executed in 1976 clearly within the prohibitory period. The Court rejected the appellate court’s characterization of the deed as a mere confirmation of non-ownership. The document’s terms—”sell, cede, convey, grant, and transfer by way of QUITCLAIM”—constitute a clear alienation or conveyance, which is absolutely prohibited within the five-year term. This prohibition is a matter of public policy to preserve the grantee’s rights and ensure the land remains with the family. Consequently, the deed is null and void ab initio. The Court further noted that such a violation renders the homestead patent susceptible to cancellation and reversion proceedings, which may be instituted by the Solicitor General on behalf of the State.