G.R. No. 173252 ; July 17, 2009
UNISOURCE COMMERCIAL AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. JOSEPH CHUNG, KIAT CHUNG and KLETO CHUNG, Respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Unisource is the registered owner of a parcel of land in Manila. Its title, TCT No. 176253, contains an annotation of a voluntary easement of right of way in favor of the adjacent estate, originally owned by Francisco Hidalgo. This easement, established by court order in 1924, allowed Hidalgo to open doors and pass through the servient estate to access an estero. Through successive transfers, the dominant estate is now owned by respondents, the Chung brothers. Unisource filed a petition to cancel this encumbrance, arguing the dominant estate now has adequate access to Matienza Street, a public road, rendering the easement unnecessary. The trial court granted the petition after an ocular inspection confirmed the alternative access.
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision. It held that the trial court erroneously applied provisions on legal easements to a voluntary one. The appellate court ruled that a voluntary easement, established by agreement or court order like the 1924 decree, cannot be extinguished merely by the presence of an alternative outlet. Unisource elevated the case to the Supreme Court, contending the easement was personal to the original parties and its continued enforcement results in unjust enrichment for the respondents.

ISSUE

Whether the annotated voluntary easement of right of way may be extinguished on the ground that the dominant estate has acquired an adequate outlet to a public highway.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and denied the petition. The Court clarified the critical distinction between legal (or compulsory) easements and voluntary easements. A legal easement of right of way under Article 649 of the Civil Code is granted by law only when an estate is isolated without adequate outlet to a public highway. Such an easement is extinguished once the isolation ceases. In contrast, a voluntary easement is established by the will of the parties, through a contract or a judicial decree based on their agreement, as in the 1924 order. It constitutes a property right and a real obligation that runs with the land, binding successive owners.
The Court ruled that Article 631(3) of the Civil Code, which provides for extinguishment when the estates fall into a condition that the easement cannot be used, refers to physical or legal impossibility of use, not mere convenience. The acquisition of another outlet does not render the use of the voluntary easement impossible; it merely provides an alternative. The voluntary easement, being a property right, can only be extinguished by modes provided by law, such as merger of ownership, renunciation by the dominant owner, non-use for ten years, or mutual agreement. Since none of these modes were present, the easement remains enforceable. The Court found the easement to be predial, not personal, as the annotation was consistently carried over to successive titles, indicating its intent to bind successors-in-interest. The claim of unjust enrichment was also dismissed, as the respondents are merely exercising a pre-existing property right.