G.R. No. 170979 ; February 9, 2011
JUDITH YU, Petitioner, vs. HON. ROSA SAMSON-TATAD, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 105, and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Judith Yu was convicted of estafa by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in a decision dated May 26, 2005. On June 9, 2005, she filed a motion for new trial. The RTC, through respondent Judge Rosa Samson-Tatad, denied this motion in an order dated October 17, 2005. On November 16, 2005, the petitioner filed a notice of appeal, invoking the “fresh period rule” established in Neypes v. Court of Appeals, arguing she had a fresh 15-day period from receipt of the denial order (November 3, 2005) to file her appeal, making her notice timely (up to November 18, 2005). The prosecution filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, contending it was filed 10 days late and that the Neypes rule did not apply to criminal cases. The prosecution also moved for execution of the judgment. The RTC considered these motions for resolution. The petitioner then filed a petition for prohibition to enjoin the RTC from acting on the motions to dismiss and for execution, asserting that her timely notice of appeal divested the RTC of jurisdiction.

ISSUE

Whether the “fresh period rule” enunciated in Neypes v. Court of Appeals applies to appeals in criminal cases.

RULING

Yes, the “fresh period rule” applies to appeals in criminal cases. The Supreme Court granted the petition, ruling that the fresh period of 15 days from receipt of the order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration, as established in Neypes for civil cases, equally applies to criminal appeals under Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Court based its ruling on two primary reasons: First, the substantive law, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980), specifically Section 39, makes no distinction between appeal periods for civil and criminal cases, prescribing a uniform 15-day period “in all cases.” Second, the provisions governing appeal periods in civil (Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Civil Procedure) and criminal (Section 6, Rule 122 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure) cases, though worded differently, produce the same legal effect—the appeal period is interrupted by a motion for new trial or reconsideration. The raison d’être of the fresh period rule is to standardize and eliminate confusion in counting the appeal period. Therefore, the petitioner’s notice of appeal filed on November 16, 2005, within 15 days from her receipt on November 3, 2005 of the order denying her motion for new trial, was timely filed. Consequently, the RTC lost jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeal and should be enjoined from proceeding with the motions for dismissal and execution.