G.R. No. 169498 , December 11, 2008
OSCAR DELOS SANTOS and ELIZA DELOS SANTOS, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.

FACTS

On March 18, 1998, an Isuzu van driven by Antonio Sagosoy collided with a horse-drawn carriage steered by Oscar delos Santos, who was with his four-year-old son Ferdinand. Ferdinand sustained serious injuries, including a broken spinal cord. The van bore plate number ULP 725 registered under the name of Saturnino Dy (also known as Juanito Dy) of Dyson Surface and Coating Corporation (Dyson Corporation). Sagosoy was charged with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property (Criminal Case No. 1116-V-99). The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Sagosoy guilty, sentencing him to imprisonment and ordering him to indemnify the spouses Delos Santos for damages. A writ of execution was issued against Sagosoy but returned unsatisfied. The spouses Delos Santos then moved for an alias writ of execution against Dy, alleging his subsidiary liability as Sagosoy’s employer. The RTC granted the motion. Dy’s petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals was dismissed, and the decision became final. The alias writ was also returned unsatisfied. Subsequently, the spouses Delos Santos filed a motion for a second writ of execution, identifying Dyson Corporation as a co-employer of Sagosoy alongside Dy, based on evidence including Sagosoy’s testimony that Dy was doing business in the name of Dyson Corporation, Sagosoy’s SSS record showing Dyson Corporation as his registered employer, and Dyson Corporation’s Articles of Incorporation showing Dy as a majority stockholder. The RTC granted the motion, declaring Dy and Dyson Corporation as joint employers solidarily liable. Dyson Corporation’s petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals was granted, annulling the RTC orders on the ground that piercing the corporate veil was not warranted. The spouses Delos Santos’ motion for reconsideration was denied for being filed out of time. They then filed the present special civil action for certiorari.

ISSUE

1. Whether the filing of the special civil action for certiorari is proper.
2. Whether the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in denying the spouses Delos Santos’ motion for reconsideration.
3. Whether Dy and Dyson Corporation are joint employers of Sagosoy and should be held subsidiarily liable for the civil liability arising from the crime.

RULING

1. On the propriety of certiorari: The Supreme Court found the petition proper. The Court of Appeals’ decision had become final due to the denial of the motion for reconsideration on technical grounds. However, the Supreme Court has the power to suspend its rules or except a particular case from strict application when warranted, especially to serve the demands of substantial justice and avoid a miscarriage thereof. Given the serious physical injuries sustained by a child and the pursuit of a just claim, the Court opted to relax the rules.
2. On the denial of the motion for reconsideration: The Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion for reconsideration as it was filed beyond the reglementary period. However, as stated, the Supreme Court exercised its prerogative to relax procedural rules in the interest of substantial justice.
3. On the joint employer liability: The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the RTC orders declaring Dy and Dyson Corporation as joint employers solidarily liable. The Court held that the evidence sufficiently established that Sagosoy was an employee of both Dy and Dyson Corporation. Sagosoy testified that Dy was doing business under the name Dyson Corporation. His SSS records listed Dyson Corporation as his employer. The vehicle involved, registered to Dy, was being used in the business operations of Dyson Corporation. The Articles of Incorporation showed Dy was a majority stockholder and the corporation’s President. The accident occurred while Sagosoy was undertaking an activity in furtherance of the corporation’s business. The Court ruled that the situation did not strictly require piercing the corporate veil, as the separate identities of Dy and the corporation were not being disregarded to make one liable for the other’s obligations. Instead, both were being held liable based on direct evidence that they were joint employers of the offending driver. Therefore, both Dy and Dyson Corporation should be held subsidiarily liable under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code for the civil liability arising from Sagosoy’s crime.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 28 June 2005 and the Resolution dated 30 August 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83234 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders dated 10 February 2004 and 1 March 2004 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Branch 172, in Criminal Case No. 1116-V-99 are hereby REINSTATED. No costs.