G.R. No. 169476 ; June 16, 2006
DOUGLAS LU YM, Petitioner, vs. ATTY. MAKILITO B. MAHINAY & HON. JUDGE OLEGARIO SARMIENTO, JR., Respondents.

FACTS

This petition for indirect contempt arose from Civil Case No. CEB-27717, an action for Accounting filed by Gertrudes Nabua against her son, petitioner Douglas Lu Ym, before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 24, presided by respondent Judge Olegario Sarmiento, Jr. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on grounds including prior judgment, lack of legal capacity to sue, and prescription. The respondent Judge denied the motion, a ruling affirmed by the Court of Appeals. On review in G.R. No. 161309 , the Supreme Court, in a February 23, 2005 Decision, reversed and remanded the case to the trial court to resolve the motion to dismiss anew with deliberate dispatch, finding it error to have deferred its resolution.
While the petition in G.R. No. 161309 was pending, and since no restraining order was issued, the trial court proceeded with the case. Petitioner was declared in default, and respondents presented evidence ex parte. Subsequently, on March 16, 2005, after the Supreme Court’s remand order was received by the parties, respondent Judge rendered a decision on the merits, ruling in favor of the plaintiffs and ordering petitioner to account for specific properties. Petitioner then filed this petition, alleging that the act of rendering a decision on the merits, instead of first resolving the motion to dismiss as directed by the Supreme Court, constituted defiance and indirect contempt.

ISSUE

Whether or not respondents committed indirect contempt by rendering a decision on the merits in Civil Case No. CEB-27717 after the Supreme Court had ordered the remand of the case for the specific purpose of resolving the pending motion to dismiss.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition, ruling that respondents did not commit indirect contempt. The Court explained that its February 23, 2005 Decision in G.R. No. 161309 did not categorically order the trial court to refrain from further proceedings or to hold the case in abeyance pending the resolution of the motion to dismiss. The directive was for the trial court to resolve the motion to dismiss “anew with deliberate dispatch.” The Court noted that the proceedings leading to the March 16, 2005 decision occurred before the remand order was received and were not enjoined. Furthermore, the trial court, in its decision, had effectively passed upon the very grounds raised in the motion to dismiss, such as Gertrudes’s capacity to sue and the issue of fraud. To nullify the decision and restart proceedings solely to rule on the motion would be a waste of time. The proper recourse for petitioner was to challenge the alleged procedural error through an appeal of the trial court’s decision, which was already pending before the Court of Appeals. For an act to be contemptuous, it must be clearly contrary to a definitive court order; no such clear defiance was established in this case.