GR 169345; (August, 2010) (Digest)
G.R. No. 169345 , August 25, 2010
DEE PING WEE, ARACELI WEE and MARINA U. TAN, Petitioners, vs. LEE HIONG WEE and ROSALIND WEE, Respondents.
FACTS
Petitioners Dee Ping Wee, Araceli Wee, and Marina U. Tan are the majority stockholders, and respondents Lee Hiong Wee and Rosalind Wee are the minority stockholders, of three corporations: Marcel Trading Corporation, Marine Resources Development Corporation, and First Marcel Properties, Inc. On April 16, 2004, respondents, through counsel, sent a letter to petitioner Dee Ping Wee demanding the inspection of the corporate records and financial statements of these corporations. In his reply dated April 22, 2004, Dee Ping Wee imposed conditions for granting the inspection, including requiring respondents to furnish financial reports of another company (Rico Philippines Industrial Corporation), repay cash advances, and account for export sales. As their demand was not complied with, respondents filed three separate complaints before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City for the inspection of corporate books, invoking their rights under Sections 74 and 75 of the Corporation Code. The RTC, in similarly worded Decisions dated June 23, 2004, ruled in favor of respondents and directed petitioners to allow the inspection. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the RTC in an Order dated April 21, 2005. A writ of execution was subsequently issued. Petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution and/or Suspend Execution, which the RTC denied in its April 21, 2005 Order. Petitioners then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the Court of Appeals, which was denied due course in a Resolution dated June 29, 2005. Their Motion for Reconsideration was also denied in a Resolution dated August 18, 2005. Petitioners elevated the case to the Supreme Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in denying due course to the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, which assailed the RTC Order denying petitioners’ Omnibus Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution and/or Suspend Execution.
RULING
The Supreme Court DENIED the petition. The Court held that the proper remedy from the RTC’s denial of the motion to quash the writ of execution was an appeal, not a petition for certiorari. The RTC’s Order was a final order that disposed of the incident and left nothing more to be adjudicated concerning the execution. Since the RTC’s Decisions in the main cases had long become final and executory, the issuance of the writ of execution was a ministerial duty. Petitioners’ Omnibus Motion was, in substance, a second motion for reconsideration of the final judgments, which is prohibited. The Court of Appeals correctly denied the petition for certiorari, as petitioners failed to establish that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The RTC’s denial of the motion was in accordance with law and jurisprudence. Furthermore, the Supreme Court found that the petition raised questions of fact, which are not permissible in a petition for review under Rule 45. The Court affirmed the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated June 29, 2005 and August 18, 2005.
