G.R. No. 1693 : February 5, 1904
FRANCISCO GARCIA, petitioner, vs. JOHN C. SWEENEY, judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, respondent.

FACTS:
This was an original petition for a writ of mandamus filed directly with the Supreme Court. The petitioner, Francisco Garcia, sought to compel the respondent judge to approve a bond and remit a case on appeal concerning the appointment of a guardian. The procedural history relevant to the decision is that the Supreme Court had adopted a practice wherein its clerk, upon the mere filing of an application for a writ of mandamus, would issue an order to show cause to the respondent without the application first being reviewed by the court or a member thereof. Justices Johnson and McDonough, upon being informed of this practice in the present case, formally dissented and criticized the procedure.

ISSUE:
Whether the clerk of the Supreme Court has the authority to issue an order to show cause upon the mere filing of an application for a writ of mandamus, without the court or a justice first examining the sufficiency of the application.

RULING:
No. The writ of mandamus is an extraordinary legal remedy, not a writ of right to which a party is entitled as a matter of course. The granting of the writ is discretionary with the court. An applicant must specifically allege and show in the petition that there is “no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy” available in the ordinary course of law. The clerk of court has no statutory authority under the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions to examine such an application and determine if it presents a prima facie case justifying the extraordinary remedy. Therefore, it is the duty of the court, not the clerk, to first examine the application to ascertain if the petitioner is prima facie entitled to the writ before any process issues to the respondent. The practice of allowing the clerk to issue an order to show cause automatically is erroneous, as it subjects respondents to unnecessary annoyance and labor when the application may be insufficient on its face. The dissenting opinion further noted an inconsistency in the court’s practice, as it treated applications for writs of certiorari and prohibitiongoverned by statutory language identical to that for mandamusas extraordinary proceedings requiring prior court review, while not doing so for mandamus.