G.R. No. 168973 ; August 24, 2011
CITY OF DUMAGUETE, herein Represented by City Mayor, Agustin R. Perdices, Petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY, Respondent.

FACTS

On October 14, 1998, petitioner City of Dumaguete filed an Application for Original Registration of Title under the Property Registration Decree over a 5,410-square meter parcel of land located at Barangay Looc, Dumaguete City (the subject property). The City alleged ownership through open, continuous, adverse, and notorious possession in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years since 1960. The Republic of the Philippines (through the Director of Lands) and respondent Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) filed separate Oppositions, asserting the property remained part of the public domain. During the hearings, petitioner presented Engineer Rilthe P. Dorado as a witness. Subsequently, respondent PPA filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing the Regional Trial Court (RTC) lacked jurisdiction because the subject property was foreshore land and thus not alienable and disposable. Petitioner opposed, claiming the property was reclaimed swamp land and invoking Republic Act No. 1899 , which authorizes cities to reclaim foreshore lands and grants them ownership. On September 7, 2000, the RTC granted the Motion to Dismiss, agreeing the property was foreshore land and not registrable. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration. On December 7, 2000, the RTC issued an Order reversing itself, denying the Motion to Dismiss and setting the case for further hearing, finding a need to determine whether the land was indeed foreshore or had been reclaimed. Respondent PPA filed a Motion for Reconsideration of this December 7, 2000 Order. On February 20, 2001, the RTC denied respondent’s motion. Respondent PPA then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the Court of Appeals (CA). On March 4, 2005, the CA granted the petition, set aside the RTC Orders dated December 7, 2000 and February 20, 2001, and reinstated the RTC’s September 7, 2000 Order dismissing the case. The CA held that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the Motion to Dismiss because, based on petitioner’s own evidence and admissions, the subject property was foreshore land and part of the public domain intended for public use (as part of the Dumaguete Port Zone per Presidential Proclamation No. 1232), and thus beyond the commerce of man and not susceptible to private appropriation or registration. Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the CA on June 6, 2005. Hence, this Petition for Review.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Regional Trial Court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying respondent Philippine Ports Authority’s Motion to Dismiss the application for original registration.

RULING

No, the Court of Appeals did not err. The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the CA Decision.
The RTC’s denial of the Motion to Dismiss constituted grave abuse of discretion. A motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be filed at any time. Jurisdiction over the subject matter in land registration cases is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the application. For original registration under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, the land must be alienable and disposable land of the public domain. The evidence presented by petitioner City of Dumaguete itself established that the subject property is foreshore land. The testimony and affidavit of its witness, Engr. Dorado, explicitly described the land as “formerly a swamp or foreshore area” and part of the “foreshore area of Dumaguete City.” Furthermore, the subject property is included within the Dumaguete Port Zone as delineated by Presidential Proclamation No. 1232, which reserved the area for the Dumaguete Port and placed it under the administration and management of the PPA. Lands intended for public use, such as those comprising a port zone, are part of the public domain intended for public service and are outside the commerce of man. They are not alienable and cannot be the subject of registration of title, regardless of the length of possession. Petitioner’s belated claim that the land was reclaimed under Republic Act No. 1899 constitutes a change of theory not permissible on appeal and is unsupported by evidence. The application was squarely based on possession under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, not on reclamation. Therefore, the subject property being inalienable foreshore land intended for public use, the RTC had no jurisdiction to hear the application for its registration. The CA correctly granted the writ of certiorari.