G.R. No. 168830 February 6, 2007
ERNESTO M. DE CHAVEZ, ET AL., Petitioners, vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and NORA L. MAGNAYE, Respondents.

FACTS

Private respondent Nora L. Magnaye, a professor at Batangas State University (BSU), filed an administrative complaint (OMB-1-01-1036-K) and a criminal complaint (OMB-1-01-1083-K) against several BSU officials, including petitioners Ernesto M. de Chavez (University President) and other administrators. The complaints alleged numerous offenses, including Grave Misconduct, Falsification, Dishonesty, and violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The specific charges involved unauthorized collection of graduation fees, internet fees, and other student charges without issuing official receipts, failure to conduct public bidding for rental of caps and gowns, nepotistic appointments, and other administrative irregularities. Petitioners filed a Joint Counter-Affidavit denying the allegations, asserting that student contributions were handled by the students themselves, receipts were properly issued for authorized fees, and appointments were made with proper authority.
The Office of the Ombudsman issued a Joint Resolution dated February 14, 2005, finding probable cause for several charges, including Falsification and violations of R.A. No. 3019 , and recommending the filing of corresponding Informations. It also found substantial evidence for administrative offenses and recommended penalties. A Supplemental Resolution dated July 12, 2005, modified the earlier resolution. Petitioners filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 65, arguing that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE

Whether the Office of the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause for criminal charges and substantial evidence for administrative charges against the petitioners.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman. The Court emphasized that the determination of probable cause in preliminary investigations is a function constitutionally vested in the Ombudsman. Judicial review of such determinations is limited to checking for arbitrariness; it does not permit the Court to substitute its own judgment. The Court found that the Ombudsman’s resolutions were based on the evidence submitted by both parties, including the complainants’ affidavits and the petitioners’ counter-affidavits. The Ombudsman evaluated the conflicting claims and found the complainants’ evidence sufficient to establish probable cause. This exercise of discretion, even if the Court might have arrived at a different conclusion, does not constitute grave abuse of discretion absent a clear showing of capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment.
Furthermore, the Court ruled that the Ombudsman’s finding of substantial evidence for the administrative charges was also within its discretionary authority. The standard of substantial evidence—such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion—was met based on the records. The petitioners’ remedy for the administrative aspect was to appeal to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43, not via a Rule 65 petition directly to the Supreme Court. Consequently, the Court upheld the Ombudsman’s resolutions, affirming the independence of its investigatory and prosecutory powers.