G.R. No. 168718 ; November 24, 2006
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner, vs. FARIDA T. LUCERO and COURT OF APPEALS (Cebu City), Respondents.

FACTS

Respondent Farida T. Lucero was appointed Clerk II at the Land Transportation Office (LTO) Regional Office VII. A memorandum directed her to assist the Regional Cashier in collecting miscellaneous fees. An audit later revealed sixty-nine altered miscellaneous receipts she had issued, with the copies on file with the auditor reflecting higher amounts than those with the Regional Director, resulting in a discrepancy of ₱46,400. The Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) found her guilty of dishonesty and ordered her dismissal from service with forfeiture of benefits and disqualification from public office.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the finding of dishonesty but reversed the penalty, ruling that the Ombudsman had no authority to directly order dismissal. The CA relied on an obiter dictum in Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman, which stated the Ombudsman could only recommend removal. The Ombudsman filed this petition, arguing it possesses full administrative disciplinary authority, including the power to impose and enforce penalties like dismissal.

ISSUE

Whether the Office of the Ombudsman has the constitutional and statutory authority to directly impose and order the enforcement of the penalty of dismissal from service on an appointive public official.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition, affirming the finding of dishonesty but setting aside the CA’s declaration on the Ombudsman’s power. The Court clarified that the statement in Tapiador was a non-binding obiter dictum. The constitutional grant of power to the Ombudsman under Section 13, Article XI is not merely recommendatory. It is implemented and expanded by Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989).
Specifically, Section 15 of RA 6770 grants the Ombudsman the authority to “direct the officer concerned to take” appropriate action against an erring public official and to “enforce its disciplinary authority.” Section 25 further provides that the Ombudsman’s “decision, order, or directive imposing a penalty shall be final and executory.” This statutory framework confers upon the Ombudsman the power not only to investigate and find administrative liability but also to impose and direct the implementation of penalties, including dismissal, suspension, or fine, upon appointive officials. The Court’s ruling in Ledesma v. Court of Appeals was cited as the correct doctrine affirming this executive and implementory power. Consequently, the Ombudsman’s decision dismissing respondent Lucero was affirmed as a valid and direct exercise of its disciplinary authority.