GR 168139; (January, 2009) (Digest)
G.R. No. 168139 , January 20, 2009.
FERDINAND S. AGUSTIN, Petitioner, vs. SPS. MARIANO and PRESENTACION DELOS SANTOS, Respondents.
FACTS
Respondent spouses, owners of apartment units in Manila, filed a complaint for ejectment (Civil Case No. 167142-CV) against petitioner Ferdinand Agustin, their tenant since 1990, on the ground of personal need (their grandchildren would study at UST). The Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) dismissed the complaint for failure to comply with requirements for ejectment on that ground. This decision became final and was enforced, with respondents collecting the stipulated rent and a 15% increase. Months later, respondents sent a Notice of Termination dated October 10, 2002, informing petitioner of the termination of their verbal month-to-month lease contract and giving him 30 days to vacate. Upon petitioner’s failure to vacate, respondents filed a second ejectment complaint (Civil Case No. 174168) on the ground of expiration/termination of the lease contract. The MeTC ruled in favor of respondents, ordering petitioner to vacate and pay increased rental compensation. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) reversed the MeTC, applying the principle of res judicata and ruling that filing two separate complaints for ejectment based on different grounds constituted splitting a cause of action. The Court of Appeals (CA) partly reversed the RTC, finding no res judicata, declaring the lease contract terminated on a month-to-month basis, and ordering petitioner to vacate, but limiting the rental to the previously agreed amount.
ISSUE
Whether the principle of res judicata, specifically “bar by prior judgment,” applies to bar the second ejectment case filed by respondents against petitioner.
RULING
No. The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the CA decision. The principle of res judicata in its concept of “bar by prior judgment” does not apply because there is no identity of causes of action between the first and second ejectment cases. For “bar by prior judgment” to apply, there must be identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. Here, while there is identity of parties and subject matter, the causes of action are different. The first case was based on the ground of personal need of the lessor under the Rent Control Act, while the second case was based on the expiration of the period of a verbal month-to-month lease under Article 1687 of the Civil Code. The evidence required to prove each ground is distinct; proving personal need is different from proving a valid termination of a lease contract. The dismissal of the first case for failure to prove personal need did not preclude the filing of a subsequent action on a different valid ground. The lease was on a month-to-month basis and was validly terminated by the respondents’ notice. Therefore, petitioner was lawfully ordered to vacate the premises.
