G.R. No. 167366 ; September 26, 2012
DR. PEDRO DENNIS CERENO and DR. SANTOS ZAFE, Petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES DIOGENES S. OLAVERE and FE R. SERRANO, Respondents.

FACTS

On September 16, 1995, Raymond Olavere, a stabbing victim, was rushed to Bicol Regional Medical Center (BRMC). After initial treatment, emergency exploratory laparotomy was recommended. His parents procured the requested blood. Surgeons Dr. Cereno and Dr. Zafe were then operating on another emergency case. Upon finishing, they found the senior anesthesiologist, Dr. Tatad, attending to a third emergency involving a woman giving birth to triplets. With no anesthesiologist available, they deferred Raymond’s surgery, monitoring him and finding his vital signs stable. Surgery commenced around 12:15 AM after Dr. Tatad became available. Upon opening the thoracic cavity, they discovered 3,200 cc of blood. Raymond suffered cardiac arrest and was pronounced dead at 2:30 AM from hypovolemic shock.
The victim’s parents filed a damages suit against the attending physicians and nurse. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the case against the initial attending doctor and nurse but held Dr. Cereno and Dr. Zafe jointly and severally liable for gross negligence, primarily for the delay in surgery and blood transfusion. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision in toto.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that petitioners were grossly negligent in the performance of their duties.

RULING

The Supreme Court REVERSED the Court of Appeals. The Court held that the petitioners were not guilty of gross negligence. In medical negligence cases, the plaintiff must prove by competent evidence: (1) the duty owed by the physician to the patient according to the standard of care, (2) a breach of that duty, and (3) injury resulting from that breach. The standard is that of a reasonably prudent practitioner in the same medical field under similar circumstances.
The Court found no breach of duty. The delay in surgery was justified by the unavailability of the anesthesiologist, who was handling another critical emergency. The petitioners, as surgeons, could not proceed without this essential specialist. Their decision to monitor the patient, whose vital signs were stable, and await the anesthesiologist was a reasonable medical judgment under the exigent circumstances of a public hospital with multiple emergencies. The subsequent discovery of a larger internal hemorrhage was an unforeseen development that did not, by itself, establish negligence. The cause of action pertained solely to the petitioners’ personal acts, making BRMC not an indispensable party. Absent proof of a deviation from the standard of care, no liability for damages attaches.