GR 167281; (August, 2008) (Digest)
G.R. No. 167281 ; August 28, 2008
MARY M. BAUSA and the LEGAL HEIRS OF THE LATE HONESTO K. BAUSA, petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF JUAN DINO, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioners filed a complaint for recovery of possession of a registered parcel of land against Juan Dino. On October 2, 1985, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered a decision in their favor. Dino’s appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeals, and the dismissal became final and executory on January 28, 1987. Petitioners obtained a writ of execution, but it was not served. They subsequently secured an alias writ and a writ of demolition, but these were resisted by respondents, preventing full implementation of the 1985 judgment.
On January 30, 1998, petitioners filed an independent civil action for revival of judgment. The RTC granted the petition, ruling it was timely filed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the action was barred by prescription. It ruled that the prescriptive period for filing an action upon a judgment is ten years from its finality, which commenced on January 28, 1987. The filing on January 30, 1998, was thus beyond the ten-year period. Petitioners elevated the case via certiorari.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the independent action for revival of judgment was time-barred.
RULING
The Supreme Court granted the petition, annulling the Court of Appeals’ decision. The legal logic centers on the proper computation of the prescriptive period for an action upon a judgment under Article 1144(3) of the Civil Code. The period is ten years from the time the right of action accrues. For a judgment, the right to execute by motion expires after five years from its finality under the Rules of Court. Thereafter, the judgment can only be enforced by an independent action, which prescribes in ten years. This ten-year period commences only after the right to execute by motion has expired. The Court clarified that the ten-year period for an independent action does not run from the date of finality of the judgment, but from the date the right to execute by motion lapsed.
Here, the judgment became final on January 28, 1987. Petitioners had five years, or until January 28, 1992, to execute it by motion. Their independent action filed on January 30, 1998, was filed within ten years from January 29, 1992. Therefore, the action was timely. The Court further held that the various motions and writs filed by petitioners within the five-year period were valid acts to enforce the judgment and did not convert the subsequent suit into a mere continuation of the original execution proceedings. The prescriptive period for the independent action was correctly tolled. The RTC decision was reinstated.