GR 167232; (July, 2009) (Digest)
G.R. No. 167232 July 31, 2009
D.B.T. MAR-BAY CONSTRUCTION, INC., Petitioner, vs. RICAREDO PANES, et al., Respondents.
FACTS
Respondents, led by Ricaredo Panes, filed a complaint to quiet title over a 240,146-square-meter parcel of land in Novaliches, Quezon City. They claimed ownership through open, continuous, and exclusive possession since before World War II, supported by a tax declaration. Ricaredo had initiated land registration proceedings (LRC Case No. Q-91-011), during which an overlap was discovered between his claimed property and a subdivision plan of B.C. Regalado & Co. The subject property was later conveyed via dacion en pago to petitioner D.B.T. Mar-Bay Construction, Inc. Respondents alleged that B.C. Regalado’s title, TCT No. 200519, was fraudulently used to cover their land, as the original title only pertained to a 22,615-square-meter lot, not the extensive area claimed. The Register of Deeds later admitted TCT No. 200519 actually covered 54 lots, including those overlapping respondents’ claim. The RTC dismissed the complaint, but the CA reversed, ordering the cancellation of the derivative titles and reinstating the action.
ISSUE
Whether the action for quieting of title filed by respondents is barred by prescription or laches.
RULING
No. The Supreme Court affirmed the CA’s ruling. An action to quiet title is imprescriptible when the plaintiff is in possession of the property, as possession is a continuing assertion of ownership. Respondents, alleging pre-war possession, maintained they were in actual possession, rendering the action imprescriptible. The Court clarified that even if the property were registered under the Torrens system, prescription would not run against the registered owner in possession. Since respondents claim to be the true owners in possession, their suit to remove the cloud on their title—created by what they allege are fraudulently obtained titles—does not prescribe. The principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens title does not protect a title acquired through fraud. The one-year period for reopening a decree under Section 32 of P.D. No. 1529 applies only to the original decree of registration, not to subsequent titles. Respondents’ action, aimed at subsequent titles derived from the allegedly fraudulent original, is not subject to this one-year limit. Therefore, the case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings to determine the validity of the competing claims of ownership on the merits.