G.R. No. 167011 ; April 30, 2008
SPS. CARLOS S. ROMUALDEZ AND ERLINDA R. ROMUALDEZ, petitioners, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND DENNIS GARAY, respondents.

FACTS

Private respondents filed a complaint with the COMELEC alleging that petitioners, spouses Carlos and Erlinda Romualdez, committed election offenses. Petitioners, previously registered voters in Quezon City, applied as new voters in Burauen, Leyte, stating their residence as 935 San Jose St., Burauen, but leaving blank the space for “period of residence.” The complaint alleged this was a false declaration, as they remained residents of Quezon City, and that they failed to properly transfer their registration under Section 12 of Republic Act No. 8189 (The Voter’s Registration Act). Petitioners countered that they had begun residing in Burauen, and their initial filing as new voters was an honest mistake; they subsequently filed applications for transfer of registration, which were approved.
The COMELEC Investigating Officer recommended prosecution, not under the originally cited provisions, but for violation of Section 10(g) and (j) of R.A. 8189 in relation to Section 45(j) of the same law. The COMELEC en banc adopted this recommendation in a Resolution. Section 45(j) criminalizes the violation of “any of the provisions” of R.A. 8189. Petitioners challenged the COMELEC resolution.

ISSUE

Whether Section 45(j) of R.A. 8189 is unconstitutional for being void for vagueness.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court, through the majority opinion, upheld the constitutionality of Section 45(j). The Court ruled that the provision is not void for vagueness. The legal logic is that a statute is void for vagueness only if it lacks comprehensible standards that define the prohibited act, such that persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. The Court found that Section 45(j) clearly refers to the specific provisions of R.A. 8189, particularly Section 10, which enumerates the specific acts required for voter registration. Therefore, the specific acts that constitute the offense are defined by the substantive provisions of the law (like Section 10), not by the penal clause itself (Section 45(j)). An individual is given fair notice of what conduct is proscribed by reading the penal clause in conjunction with the specific substantive provision it references. The Court further held that the overbreadth doctrine, which allows facial challenges to statutes that could chill protected speech, is not applicable here as the law regulates conduct (voter registration) and not speech. The petition was dismissed, and the COMELEC resolution was sustained.