G.R. No. 166904 ; August 11, 2008
MEDIAN CONTAINER CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, respondent.

FACTS

Metrobank filed a complaint for sum of money against Median Container Corporation (MCC) and its officers, the spouses Ley, for an unpaid loan. Summons was served on MCC at its given address on August 7, 2003, upon Danilo Ong, whom the process server identified as the “General Manager.” MCC moved to dismiss, arguing defective service of summons, claiming Ong was merely a former employee who had resigned in July 2002, and not its general manager. MCC also contested the verification and certification against forum shopping in the complaint, alleging it was signed by Atty. Alexander Mendoza on May 28, 2003, without proper authority, as the board resolution authorizing him was dated June 3, 2003. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss.
MCC elevated the case via certiorari to the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the petition. The appellate court held that Atty. Mendoza was clothed with authority when the complaint was filed on June 23, 2003, and addressed the unraised issue of summons, finding service proper under the circumstances. MCC then filed the present petition before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

The core issues are: (1) Whether the service of summons upon Danilo Ong was valid to confer jurisdiction over MCC; and (2) Whether the verification and certification against forum shopping attached to the complaint was defective for being signed by an allegedly unauthorized person at the time of signing.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition, affirming the appellate court’s decision. On the first issue, the Court found the service of summons upon Ong was invalid. Jurisdiction over a corporation is acquired only through service upon its president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel. The process server’s unilateral designation of Ong as “General Manager” was insufficient; MCC’s evidence, including a resignation letter and quitclaim, strongly indicated Ong was not an officer authorized to receive summons. Thus, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over MCC through that service.
However, the Court ruled that MCC voluntarily submitted to the trial court’s jurisdiction. By filing a motion to dismiss that invoked grounds beyond the lack of jurisdiction, such as the defective verification, and by actively participating in subsequent proceedings, MCC effectively waived any objection to the invalid service. Jurisprudence holds that a party who seeks affirmative relief submits to the court’s authority. On the second issue, the verification and certification were deemed valid. While Atty. Mendoza signed the verification on May 28, 2003, before the June 3 board resolution, the complaint itself was filed on June 23, 2003. By that date, the authority had been ratified. The Court emphasized that a verification is only a formal, not jurisdictional, requirement, and defects can be corrected. The board resolution constituted a ratification of the prior act, curing any initial defect in authority. Therefore, the trial court correctly denied the motion to dismiss.