GR 166759; (November, 2009) (Digest)
G.R. No. 166759 ; November 25, 2009
SOFIA TORRES, FRUCTOSA TORRES, HEIRS OF MARIO TORRES and SOLAR RESOURCES, INC., Petitioners, vs. NICANOR SATSATIN, EMILINDA AUSTRIA SATSATIN, NIKKI NORMEL SATSATIN and NIKKI NORLIN SATSATIN, Respondents.
FACTS
Petitioners, owners of adjacent parcels of land, authorized respondent Nicanor Satsatin via a Special Power of Attorney to negotiate the sale of their properties to Solar Resources, Inc. Petitioners alleged that Solar paid the full purchase price to Nicanor, but he remitted only a portion to them, leaving an unremitted balance of ₱19,000,000.00. Consequently, petitioners filed a complaint for sum of money and damages and secured an ex-parte writ of preliminary attachment from the RTC.
The sheriff levied upon respondents’ properties on November 19, 2002. However, the summons and a copy of the complaint were served on respondents only on November 21, 2002. Respondents moved to discharge the writ, arguing it was issued and enforced before the court acquired jurisdiction over their persons through service of summons. The RTC denied the motion but allowed respondents to post a counter-bond. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC, ordering the discharge of the writ, a ruling petitioners challenged before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE
Whether the writ of preliminary attachment was validly issued and enforced despite the service of summons occurring after the levy of the respondents’ properties.
RULING
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the Court of Appeals. The writ of preliminary attachment was void for having been enforced prior to the court’s acquisition of jurisdiction over the respondents. A writ of attachment is a coercive process, and the court must first acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, either by voluntary appearance or through service of summons, before it can enforce such a writ against them. The rule is explicit that the writ shall be served “after or at the time of” the service of summons.
In this case, the sheriff levied upon the properties on November 19, 2002, while the summons was served only on November 21, 2002. This sequence violated the fundamental rule on jurisdiction. The subsequent service of summons did not cure this fatal defect or retroactively validate the earlier enforcement of the writ. Jurisdiction must exist at the time of the coercive act. The Court emphasized that the law does not allow for the retroactivity of a belated service of summons to justify an earlier attachment. Therefore, the writ was properly ordered discharged.