GR 166510; (April, 2009) (Digest)
G.R. No. 166510 ; April 29, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. BENJAMIN “KOKOY” ROMUALDEZ, and SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.
FACTS
The Office of the Ombudsman charged Benjamin “Kokoy” Romualdez before the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The Information alleged that from 1976 to February 1986, Romualdez, while serving as the Provincial Governor of Leyte, used his influence with his brother-in-law, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, to have himself appointed as Ambassador to the People’s Republic of China, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the United States of America. He held these positions concurrently with his governorship, enabling him to collect dual compensation from both the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Provincial Government of Leyte, totaling P5,806,709.50 and P293,348.86, to the damage and prejudice of the government.
Romualdez moved to quash the information on two grounds: (1) the facts alleged do not constitute the offense charged, arguing that Section 3(e) applies only to acts involving the grant of licenses, permits, or concessions, and that receiving dual compensation for actual services rendered does not cause damage to the government; and (2) the criminal action has prescribed, contending that the 15-year prescriptive period under R.A. 3019 had lapsed as the preliminary investigation commenced only in May 2001 for offenses committed from 1976 to 1986, and that proceedings under a 1987 complaint filed with the Presidential Commission on Good Government were null and void.
The Sandiganbayan granted the motion to quash, ruling that the Information did not sufficiently aver how receiving dual compensation resulted in undue injury to the government, as there was no showing Romualdez did not actually render services for both positions. It found the elements of causing undue injury and acting with evident bad faith or gross negligence wanting. However, it found no merit in Romualdez’s prescription argument. The Sandiganbayan denied the People’s motion for reconsideration and Romualdez’s partial motion for reconsideration on prescription.
The People filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 before the Supreme Court, imputing grave abuse of discretion to the Sandiganbayan. Romualdez moved to dismiss, arguing the proper remedy was an appeal under Rule 45 since the order was final.
ISSUE
Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in granting Romualdez’s motion to quash the Information for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019.
RULING
The Supreme Court, in a prior Decision dated July 23, 2008, granted the petition. While acknowledging that the proper mode to review a final Sandiganbayan ruling is via a Rule 45 petition, the Court allowed the Rule 65 petition on the claim of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The Court found that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in quashing the Information. The Resolution dated April 29, 2009, addresses procedural and substantive matters following that Decision.
The Court held that the Sandiganbayan’s act of quashing the Information based on its assessment of the evidence (the lack of showing that Romualdez did not render services) constituted grave abuse of discretion. In a motion to quash, the facts alleged in the information must be hypothetically admitted. The Information sufficiently alleged all the elements of a violation of Section 3(e): Romualdez was a public officer; he acted with evident bad faith by securing incompatible appointments; and his act of collecting dual compensation caused undue injury to the government. Whether he actually rendered services is a matter of defense to be proven during trial, not a ground to quash the information. The Sandiganbayan overstepped its jurisdiction by pre-emptively evaluating the merits of the case and the evidence at the pleading stage.
Regarding prescription, the Court in its July 23, 2008 Decision rejected Romualdez’s argument. It held that the prescriptive period was interrupted by the filing of the 1987 complaint with the PCGG, and the provision in the Revised Penal Code that prescription does not run when the offender is absent from the Philippines applies by analogy to special laws like R.A. 3019.
Thus, the Sandiganbayan’s Resolutions quashing the Information were annulled and set aside, and the case was remanded to the Sandiganbayan for further proceedings.
