GR 166036; (June, 2009) (Digest)
G.R. No. 166036 ; June 19, 2009
NENA A. CARIΓO, Petitioner, vs. ESTRELLA M. ESPINOZA, represented by her attorney-in-fact MANUEL P. MEJIA, JR., Respondent.
FACTS
The case originated from an action for Legal Redemption and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Injunction filed by respondent Estrella M. Espinoza against petitioner Nena A. CariΓ±o and Modesto Penullar. Respondent was a co-owner of a 2/4 share of an undivided parcel of land (Lot 422, Mangaldan Cadastre). Penullar owned a 1/4 share. In 1988, respondent heard rumors Penullar was selling his share; both Penullar and petitioner denied this. On July 25, 1989, respondent learned Penullar had executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of petitioner. The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of respondent, ordering the defendants to allow redemption of Penullar’s share, execute a deed of redemption, and pay attorney’s fees and costs, and making the preliminary injunction permanent. Petitioner appealed. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal due to petitioner’s failure to file the appellant’s brief within the extended deadline of March 1, 2003, despite a stern warning against further extensions. The Judicial Records Division reported no brief was filed by September 8, 2003. After respondent filed a Manifestation with Motion on September 11, 2003, praying the appeal be deemed waived, petitioner’s counsel filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Appellant’s Brief and the brief itself on October 15, 2003. Petitioner’s counsel cited an “attack of acute hypertension” on February 8, 2003, as the reason for delay, supported by a medical certificate issued on October 13, 2003. The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in dismissing the appeal for failure of petitioner to file the appellant’s brief.
RULING
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the Court of Appeals’ resolutions. The Court held that the general rule is that a client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of counsel in procedural matters. Exceptions, such as gross negligence depriving due process, were not present. Petitioner’s reason did not fully justify the failure to comply. The hypertension attack occurred on February 8, 2003, yet the appellant’s brief was belatedly submitted only on October 15, 2003, seven months after the March 1, 2003 deadline. The medical certificate was issued only on October 13, 2003. The belated submission, made only after respondent’s motion, did not constitute substantial compliance. While rules of procedure should facilitate justice, the right to appeal is a statutory privilege that must be exercised in accordance with the law. The dismissal was proper under Section 1(e), Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
