GR 165952; (July, 2008) (Digest)
G.R. No. 165952 ; July 28, 2008
ANECO REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. LANDEX DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.
FACTS
Fernandez Hermanos Development, Inc. (FHDI) owned a tract of land in Quezon City, which it subdivided into 39 lots. FHDI sold 22 lots to petitioner Aneco Realty and Development Corporation and the remaining 17 lots to respondent Landex Development Corporation. The dispute arose when Landex began constructing a concrete wall on one of its lots. Aneco filed a complaint for injunction to restrain the construction, arguing that the wall blocked its access via a road lot from the original, now-defunct, subdivision plan of FHDI. The Regional Trial Court initially granted the injunction but later granted Landex’s motion for reconsideration and dismissed the complaint.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal. It found that when FHDI sold the lots to Aneco, the deed of sale expressly stated FHDI was no longer interested in pursuing its subdivision project. Consequently, the lots were sold as ordinary lots, not as units within an active subdivision. Aneco appealed to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the dismissal of Aneco’s complaint for injunction, thereby allowing Landex to fence its property.
RULING
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision. The core legal principle is that the right to fence is an inherent attribute of ownership under Article 428 of the Civil Code. An injunction, being a prohibitory remedy, requires the plaintiff to prove a clear and unmistakable legal right to restrain the defendant’s act. Aneco failed to establish such a right.
The Court explained that Aneco could not claim a right of way or access based on the old subdivision plan because the subdivision project was abandoned. The deed of sale between FHDI and Aneco clearly indicated the lots were not sold as subdivision units. Therefore, the intended road lot from the abandoned plan did not create a legal easement in favor of Aneco’s property. Since Aneco’s property had other accesses to public roads, no legal easement of right of way was established. Absent a clear legal right, the Court would not restrain Landex from exercising its fundamental right as an owner to fence its own property. The complaint for injunction was correctly dismissed for lack of merit.