G.R. No. 164966 , June 8, 2007
ROLANDO TAN, ELENA TAN and LAMBERTO TAN, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. HERMES B. MONTERO, in his capacity as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS

James L. King filed complaints for Estafa and violation of B.P. 22 against Roderick Lim-Go and others, alleging that Roderick issued several dishonored checks in connection with cash loans. In a Second Supplemental Complaint-Affidavit, King impleaded petitioners Rolando, Elena, and Lamberto Tan (parents and brother of Roderick’s wife, Grace Tan-Go). King alleged that on March 22, 2002, the spouses Go, together with the petitioners, solicited a ₱40 million loan from him for a business renovation, for which Roderick issued checks totaling ₱61.28 million. These checks were later dishonored.
Petitioners, in their counter-affidavit, denied meeting King on March 22, 2002, and asserted that only Roderick Go could be liable for the bouncing checks as he was the sole issuer. They argued that King’s supplemental complaints were contradictory and that their inclusion was an afterthought. Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Hermes Montero found probable cause for Estafa against petitioners and the others, leading to the filing of five Informations. Petitioners filed a petition for prohibition and injunction with the Court of Appeals to stop the trial, but it was dismissed.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition and upholding the finding of probable cause for Estafa against the petitioners.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the Court of Appeals. The legal logic centers on the limited scope of judicial review over a prosecutor’s finding of probable cause. Probable cause is defined as a reasonable belief that a crime has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof. The Court emphasized that in a petition for prohibition, the inquiry is confined to determining whether the prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause. Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
The Court found no such abuse. The prosecutor evaluated the sworn complaint and the counter-affidavits. King’s allegation that petitioners jointly solicited the loan, which led to the issuance of the checks, was sufficient to establish probable cause for conspiracy in Estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code. The factual dispute regarding the March 22, 2002 meeting and the petitioners’ denial of involvement are matters of defense best ventilated in a full-blown trial, not in a preliminary investigation. The prosecutor’s determination, based on the submitted affidavits, was not arrived at arbitrarily. Consequently, the Court of Appeals correctly refused to interfere with the prosecutor’s discretion and the trial court’s authority to proceed with the criminal cases.