GR 164823; (August, 2005) (Digest)
G.R. No. 164823 August 31, 2005
MARIA CARLOS, represented by TERESITA CARLOS VICTORIA, Petitioners, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
FACTS
Petitioner Maria Carlos, represented by her daughter Teresita Carlos Victoria, filed an application for original registration of title over a 3,975-square-meter parcel of land in Taguig, Metro Manila. She claimed open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession in the concept of an owner since July 12, 1945, or earlier, tacking her possession with that of her predecessor-in-interest, her father Jose Carlos. The Republic opposed the application. The trial court granted the petition, finding that the land was alienable and disposable and that the applicant and her predecessor had possessed the land for the required period.
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision. It found that Maria Carlos had sold the subject property to Ususan Development Corporation via a Deed of Absolute Sale dated October 16, 1996. This fact was admitted by Teresita Carlos Victoria during her testimony, wherein she also stated that the heirs had promised to deliver the certificate of title to the corporation upon its issuance to settle the unpaid balance of the purchase price.
ISSUE
Whether the petitioner is entitled to confirmation and registration of title under the Property Registration Decree.
RULING
No. The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The core legal principle applied is that for a grant of original registration, the applicant must prove possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership at the time the application is filed. The Court found that the 1996 Deed of Absolute Sale expressly transferred possession of the property to Ususan Development Corporation. Consequently, from that date, Maria Carlos (and later her heirs) no longer possessed the land in the concept of an owner. Possession in the concept of an owner exists when the possessor claims to be the owner himself; possession as a mere holder acknowledges a superior right in another. By acknowledging the sale and committing to deliver the title to the corporation, the petitioner’s possession, if any existed after 1996, was merely that of a holder, not an owner. Since the application was filed in 2001, the petitioner failed to satisfy the indispensable requirement of possession in the concept of an owner at the time of filing. Therefore, she had no registrable title.