GR 164443; (June, 2010) (Digest)
G.R. No. 164443 ; June 18, 2010
Eriberto S. Masangkay, Petitioner, vs. People of the Philippines, Respondent.
FACTS
Petitioner Eriberto Masangkay filed a Petition for Involuntary Dissolution of Megatel Factors, Inc. (MFI) with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). In his sworn petition, he alleged that a Secretary’s Certificate referencing a December 5, 1992 board meeting was fictitious because no such meeting took place. He further claimed that a subsequent “Deed of Exchange with Cancellation of Usufruct,” which exchanged corporate shares for a lot owned by a minor, was a simulated and void contract as the minor’s guardian was never a stockholder. Based on these sworn allegations, Cesar Masangkay, a respondent in the SEC case, filed a criminal complaint for perjury against Eriberto.
The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor initially dismissed the perjury complaint, citing the primary jurisdiction of the SEC over the intra-corporate dispute and the existence of a prejudicial question. However, the Department of Justice reinstated the complaint, ruling that perjury under the Revised Penal Code is not within the SEC’s enforcement authority and that the pending SEC case did not constitute a prejudicial question. An Information for perjury was subsequently filed. After trial, the Regional Trial Court convicted Eriberto, a decision affirmed with modification by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE
Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner Eriberto Masangkay committed the crime of perjury.
RULING
No. The Supreme Court acquitted petitioner Eriberto Masangkay. The prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. For perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code, the prosecution must establish that the accused made a deliberate assertion of falsehood on a material matter. The Court found that the prosecution did not conclusively prove the falsity of Eriberto’s sworn statements. His claim that the December 5, 1992 board meeting did not occur was supported by the corporate secretary’s testimony and the absence of corporate records for such a meeting. Furthermore, his allegation that the Deed of Exchange was simulated was a legal conclusion based on his interpretation of the transaction’s validity, not a statement of fact. A contract being void or simulated is a legal determination, not a factual assertion easily proven false. Since the prosecution’s evidence did not overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence and the alleged falsehoods remained unproven, the conviction was reversed.