G.R. No. 164110 ; February 12, 2008
LEONOR B. CRUZ, petitioner, vs. TEOFILA M. CATAPANG, respondent.

FACTS

Petitioner Leonor B. Cruz, along with Luz Cruz and Norma Maligaya, are co-owners of a parcel of land in Taal, Batangas. In 1992, respondent Teofila M. Catapang constructed a house on an adjacent lot, but a portion of this house encroached upon the co-owned property. Respondent built the house with the consent of co-owner Norma Maligaya. Petitioner discovered the encroachment in September 1995 during a visit and subsequently demanded that respondent vacate and demolish the intruding structure. Respondent refused.
Petitioner filed a complaint for forcible entry before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), which ruled in her favor, ordering respondent to vacate. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed this decision. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC, dismissing the complaint. The appellate court held that respondent’s entry, having been with the consent of one co-owner, was not effected through strategy or stealth, thus negating a cause of action for forcible entry. It concluded petitioner’s proper remedy was not an ejectment action.

ISSUE

Whether consent given by one co-owner for the construction of a house on co-owned property warrants the dismissal of a forcible entry case filed by another co-owner against the builder.

RULING

The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversing the Court of Appeals and reinstating the RTC decision. The Court held that the consent of a single co-owner does not validate an act that prejudices the co-ownership or excludes other co-owners. Under Articles 486 and 491 of the Civil Code, each co-owner may use the common property but cannot, without the consent of all, make alterations or devote it to exclusive use to the detriment of others. Respondent’s construction, which encroached on the common property, effectively appropriated a portion for her exclusive benefit, injuring the interests of the other co-owners. Such act by a co-owner granting exclusive use is invalid.
Furthermore, the Court ruled that respondent’s entry constituted “strategy” for purposes of forcible entry. By obtaining consent from only one co-owner while excluding the others, respondent employed a scheme to gain possession, satisfying the element of strategy under ejectment law. The one-year prescriptive period for filing forcible entry was duly observed, as it commenced from September 1995 when petitioner discovered the encroachment, not from the 1992 construction date. The complaint filed in January 1996 was therefore timely.