GR 163924; (June, 2009) (Digest)
G.R. No. 163924 ; June 18, 2009
“J” MARKETING CORPORATION represented by its Branch Manager ELMUNDO DADOR, Petitioner, vs. CESAR L. TARAN, Respondent.
FACTS
Respondent Cesar L. Taran worked for petitioner “J” Marketing Corporation from 1981 to 1993 as a credit investigator/collector. In February 1993, he verbally informed the Officer-in-Charge, Hector Caludac, of his intention to resign. Caludac sent a memorandum requiring a formal resignation letter, which Taran submitted on February 15, 1993, citing ill health and poor performance as reasons, effective March 1, 1993.
Subsequently, Taran filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and monetary claims before the NLRC. He alleged that his resignation was not voluntary but was based on a verbal agreement with Caludac that he would receive 100% separation pay and other benefits upon formally tendering his resignation. He claimed the management even prepared the resignation letter for his signature. Petitioner corporation countered that the resignation was truly voluntary, prompted by Taran’s failure to meet collection quotas and his physical illness, and denied any such verbal agreement.
ISSUE
Whether or not respondent Taran, having submitted a resignation letter, is entitled to separation pay and other benefits.
RULING
Yes, the respondent is entitled to separation pay. The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the Labor Arbiter, NLRC, and Court of Appeals. The Court ruled that the resignation was not voluntary in the legal sense. The factual findings of the lower tribunals, which are accorded respect and finality, established the existence of a verbal agreement between Taran and Caludac. The February 13, 1993 memorandum from Caludac, which required Taran to submit a formal resignation letter after he had verbally informed the regional manager of his intention, substantiated this agreement. The Court held that Taran would not have resigned without the assurance of receiving his benefits after over eleven years of service.
Therefore, the act of tendering the resignation letter was not an unconditional act of volition but was induced by the promise of benefits. Consequently, the termination of employment was deemed not a voluntary resignation but a dismissal, entitling Taran to separation pay. The award of rest day differential for a limited period and attorney’s fees was also upheld. The petition was denied for lack of merit.