GR 163745; (August, 2007) (Digest)
G.R. No. 163745 ; August 24, 2007
FERNANDO GO, Petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, PILAR LIM and HENRY LIM, Respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Fernando Go filed a criminal complaint for estafa through falsification of public document against his sister Pilar Lim and nephew Henry Lim. He alleged that after their mother, Laureana Lu, obtained Original Certificate of Title No. P-136 in 1976 for a Cotabato property, respondents deceitfully procured several documents, including a Waiver of Rights from Laureana in favor of Henry and a Waiver signed by Fernando and his siblings. Respondents allegedly misrepresented that the transfer was necessary to facilitate the titling process. Fernando claimed he only discovered the fraud in 1998 upon learning of tax arrears. The Quezon City Prosecutor found probable cause and filed an information in court.
Respondents appealed to the Department of Justice (DOJ), arguing prescription and lack of probable cause. The DOJ directed the withdrawal of the information, ruling the notarized documents bore a presumption of genuineness and the crime had prescribed, as the 20-year prescriptive period for estafa through falsification (punishable by reclusion temporal) had lapsed from the 1976 execution of the documents to the 2002 filing of the complaint. The trial court allowed the withdrawal. The Court of Appeals dismissed Goβs petition for certiorari, citing procedural deficiencies and finding no grave abuse of discretion in the DOJβs resolution.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition and upholding the DOJβs resolution which directed the withdrawal of the information on grounds of prescription and lack of probable cause.
RULING
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the Court of Appeals. On the substantive issue, the Court found no grave abuse of discretion in the DOJβs determination. The DOJ correctly held that the crime had prescribed. Estafa through falsification under Article 171(3) of the Revised Penal Code is punishable by reclusion temporal, which prescribes in 20 years from its commission. The alleged falsification occurred in 1976 with the execution of the waivers, while the complaint was filed only in 2002, beyond the prescriptive period. Petitionerβs claim of discovering the deceit only in 1998 was deemed unconvincing, as he was a participant in the 1976 waiver, making such delayed discovery improbable.
Furthermore, the DOJ did not commit grave abuse in finding no probable cause for falsification. The notarized documents carried the presumption of regularity, and the notary public affirmed their due execution. For falsification under Article 171(3), the element of attributing to a participant statements other than those actually made was not sufficiently established. The Secretary of Justice has broad discretion in evaluating probable cause during a petition for review, and courts cannot substitute their judgment absent a clear showing of capricious or whimsical exercise of power. No such abuse was present here. The appellate courtβs dismissal, based on both procedural grounds and the merits, was thus upheld.
