GR 162836; (July, 2009) (Digest)
G.R. No. 162836 ; July 30, 2009
CEFERINA ARGALLON-JOCSON and RODOLFO TUISING, Petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BONIFACIO T. ONG, in his capacity as the acting Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Roxas, Isabela, Branch 23, MARIA CRISTINA FERTILIZER CORP., and MARCELO STEEL CORP., Respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Ceferina Argallon-Jocson obtained a favorable final judgment against respondents Marcelo Steel Corporation and Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation (MCFC) for payment of a sum of money. The dispositive portion of the decision ordered the defendants to pay the plaintiff the specified amounts but was silent on whether the obligation was joint or solidary. To satisfy the judgment, sheriffs levied upon and sold properties of Marcelo Steel at a public auction, where petitioner Rodolfo Tuising emerged as the highest bidder, and a certificate of sale was issued.
Marcelo Steel Corporation moved to annul the execution sale, arguing its obligation was merely joint with MCFC and that the levy on its properties to satisfy the entire judgment debt was improper. The Regional Trial Court granted the motion, declared the sale null and void, and set aside the certificate of sale. It ruled that in the absence of a declaration of solidary liability in the fallo, the presumption is that the obligation is only joint. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order and subsequently dismissed the petitioners’ special civil action for certiorari.
ISSUE
Whether the Regional Trial Court committed grave abuse of discretion in annulling the execution sale against Marcelo Steel Corporation based on the finding that the obligation was merely joint and not solidary.
RULING
No, the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court affirmed the rulings of the lower courts. The core legal principle is that the nature of a judgment obligor’s liability is determined by the dispositive portion (fallo) of the decision. Where the fallo is silent on the nature of the liability, it is construed as joint, not solidary. Solidary liability cannot be presumed and must be expressly stated. Since the decision in this case did not state that the liability of Marcelo Steel and MCFC was solidary, their obligation was correctly deemed to be merely joint.
Consequently, Marcelo Steel Corporation could only be held liable for its proportionate share of the judgment debt. The execution levied upon and sold its properties to satisfy the entire obligation, which included the share of MCFC. This was a violation of Marcelo Steel’s rights as a judgment debtor with only joint liability. The trial court’s act of annulling the execution sale to correct this wrongful enforcement was a proper exercise of its jurisdiction and control over its processes; it was not undertaken in a capricious or whimsical manner. Therefore, the act did not constitute grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.