G.R. No. 161179 August 7, 2007
NACE SUE P. BUAN, petitioner, vs. FRANCISCO T. MATUGAS, respondent.

FACTS

Petitioner Nace Sue P. Buan filed a complaint for attempted rape against respondent Francisco T. Matugas, then the Provincial Governor of Surigao del Norte and her employer. She alleged that in July 1995, during an official trip to Manila, respondent lured her to his hotel room under a work-related pretext. Inside the room, respondent, after emerging from the bathroom shirtless, suddenly grabbed, embraced, and kissed her. Petitioner resisted by pushing and elbowing him, causing him to desist. Petitioner resigned shortly after but delayed filing a formal complaint for almost six years due to respondent’s influence.
The City Prosecutor of Pasay City dismissed the complaint for lack of probable cause. On appeal, the Secretary of Justice reversed this finding, holding there was reasonable ground to believe a crime was committed and directed the filing of an information for attempted rape. Respondent then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA), which granted the petition, reversed the Secretary of Justice’s resolutions, and ordered the dismissal of the criminal information.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause for attempted rape.

RULING

Yes, the Supreme Court reversed the CA. The Court held that the CA overstepped its certiorari jurisdiction. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is limited to reviewing jurisdictional errors or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It does not grant appellate authority to re-evaluate the factual findings and conclusions of the quasi-judicial officer, in this case, the Secretary of Justice.
The Secretary of Justice did not commit grave abuse of discretion. Probable cause merely requires a reasonable belief that a crime has been committed and the accused is probably guilty. The determination of whether the respondent’s acts demonstrated “lewd design” necessary for attempted rape, as opposed to acts of lasciviousness, is a matter of evidentiary weight best resolved in a full-blown trial, not at the preliminary investigation stage. The prosecutor’s prerogative to file a higher charge is a valid exercise of discretion to avoid potential legal pitfalls, such as being precluded from proving qualifying circumstances later at trial. The CA improperly substituted its own judgment on the existence of lewd design, a factual matter, which was beyond the scope of a certiorari review.