G.R. No. 160863 ; September 27, 2006
NELSON ZAGALA and FELICIANO M. ANGELES, petitioners, vs. MIKADO PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, YOSHINARI KONO and TAKEHIKO OGURA, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners Nelson Zagala and Feliciano Angeles were laborers for respondent Mikado Philippines Corporation. In 1998, Mikado reviewed attendance records and found that from 1995 to 1997, both petitioners consistently exceeded the company’s annual allowance of only 30 absences. Zagala incurred 40, 34.5, and 59.5 absences, while Angeles incurred 32.5, 35, and 40 absences for those respective years. The petitioners submitted letters explaining their absences were due to family illnesses and problems. Mikado found the explanations unsatisfactory and terminated their employment on March 1, 1998.
The Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) ruled in favor of the petitioners, declaring their dismissal illegal. They ordered reinstatement and payment of backwages, reasoning that the absences in 1995 and 1996 had already been sanctioned by a prior warning memorandum and thus could not be used again as grounds for dismissal. The Court of Appeals reversed the NLRC, holding that the petitioners’ habitual absenteeism constituted gross and habitual neglect of duties, a valid cause for termination under the Labor Code, and that previous related infractions could be considered in justifying dismissal.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the NLRC and ruling that the petitioners were validly dismissed on the ground of habitual absenteeism.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, thereby upholding the validity of the dismissal. The legal logic is anchored on Article 282(c) of the Labor Code, which recognizes gross and habitual neglect of duties as a just cause for termination. The Court emphasized that habitual absenteeism, as demonstrated by the petitioners’ repeated and excessive violations of the company’s 30-day annual absence policy over three consecutive years, clearly constitutes such neglect.
The Court rejected the petitioners’ argument that the prior warning for the 1995 and 1996 absences barred their use in the 1998 dismissal. Jurisprudence establishes that while a prior offense cannot be the sole basis for a subsequent dismissal, it can be considered as an aggravating circumstance when the subsequent offense is of the same nature. Here, the petitioners’ continued and even worsening absenteeism in 1997, after having been warned for the same infraction in prior years, demonstrated a pattern of habitual neglect. The employer’s act of issuing a prior warning for related offenses does not constitute a waiver of its right to subsequently dismiss an employee for a repetition of the same offense. The dismissal was therefore justified, having been for a lawful cause and effected with due process, as the petitioners were given an opportunity to explain their side.