G.R. No. 160174 August 28, 2006
FRANCISCO SILVA as NEA Administrator, Petitioner, vs. LEOVIGILDO T. MATIONG, Respondent.

FACTS

Respondent Leovigildo T. Mationg was the General Manager of Aklan Electric Cooperative, Inc. (AKELCO). Due to AKELCO’s failure to pay a substantial obligation to the National Power Corporation, resulting in a power cut-off, the National Electrification Administration (NEA) took over AKELCO’s management. An intra-corporate dispute arose within AKELCO’s Board of Directors, leading to conflicting resolutions: one faction placed respondent under preventive suspension, while another expressed full confidence in him. NEA Deputy Administrator Edita Bueno initially approved a 30-day preventive suspension but later revoked it, submitting the matter to the NEA Board of Administrators (NEA-BOA). Following a committee evaluation, NEA Administrator Francisco Silva approved the suspension resolution. Subsequently, the NEA-BOA authorized petitioner to remove respondent as General Manager, which he did via an order dated April 19, 2002. The AKELCO Board then conducted an investigation, found respondent guilty of gross neglect and willful breach of trust, and terminated his services, an action later approved by petitioner.

ISSUE

The core issue is whether the NEA Administrator had the legal authority to unilaterally remove the General Manager of an electric cooperative.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled that the NEA Administrator had no such authority; the power to remove resides solely with the NEA Board of Administrators. The Court examined Section 5(e) of Presidential Decree No. 269, as amended by P.D. No. 1645, which explicitly vests all corporate powers of the NEA in its Board of Administrators. This includes the disciplinary power to suspend or remove officers of electric cooperatives. The Court emphasized that the Administrator is merely an executive officer who implements the policies and directives of the Board. The Board’s resolutions, which purportedly granted “standby authority” to the Administrator, were deemed insufficient to constitute a valid delegation of the removal power. A delegation of such a potent discretionary power requires a clear and specific law; it cannot be inferred from internal resolutions. Consequently, the Administrator’s act of removing respondent was void for having been performed without proper authority. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision nullifying the removal orders, upholding the principle that statutory powers vested in a collegial body must be exercised by that body itself unless lawfully delegated.