G.R. No. 158397 , November 26, 2004
Neil Tamondong, petitioner, vs. Court of Appeals and World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc., respondents.

FACTS

World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. (WWVLPI) filed a complaint for recovery of possession and damages against Neil Tamondong and others before the RTC of Quezon City. WWVLPI claimed ownership and prior possession of the subject property based on court orders. It alleged that Sorovabel Esteves, as an allocatee of a portion of the property, demanded that the defendants vacate, but they refused. The verification and certification against forum shopping attached to the complaint was executed by Esteves, who identified himself as the “Attorney-in-fact and Allocatee” of the lot for and in behalf of WWVLPI.
Upon service of summons, the RTC issued an order dismissing the complaint motu proprio. The trial court ruled that Esteves, who filed the case on behalf of WWVLPI, was not clothed with the appropriate authority and was therefore not the proper party to institute the action. WWVLPI moved for reconsideration, arguing that Esteves, as an allocatee and real party-in-interest, could be affected by the case’s outcome and that the court dismissed the case prematurely without allowing it to present the special power of attorney during trial. The RTC denied the motion.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the RTC’s order which dismissed the complaint for lack of a proper party plaintiff.

RULING

No, the Court of Appeals did not err. The Supreme Court affirmed the CA’s decision, holding that the RTC committed a reversible error in dismissing the complaint. The ground invoked by the RTC—that Esteves was not the proper party—pertains to the plaintiff’s “legal capacity to sue,” not the failure to state a cause of action. A motion to dismiss based on lack of legal capacity to sue must be raised by the defendant in a motion to dismiss or in the answer; it cannot be a ground for the court’s motu proprio dismissal. The Rules of Court explicitly list the grounds for a motu proprio dismissal, and lack of legal capacity to sue is not among them.
Furthermore, the complaint sufficiently alleged a cause of action. WWVLPI asserted its ownership and prior possession of the property, the defendants’ occupation thereof, and the consequent deprivation of its rights. These allegations, if hypothetically admitted, would entitle WWVLPI to relief. Any perceived defect regarding the authority of the person who signed the verification could be cured by its subsequent submission or ratification; it did not warrant the immediate dismissal of the case. The RTC should have proceeded with the case and resolved the issue of authority during trial, not at the nascent stage.