G.R. No. 158328 ; February 23, 2007
FRANCO ESGUERRA, Petitioner, vs. ALFONSO MANANTAN, DANILO MANANTAN, ARIANG ANTONIO, AQUILINO CONCEPCION, and FORTUNATO MIGUEL, Respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Franco Esguerra filed an ejectment complaint against respondents, claiming ownership of a parcel of land in Nueva Ecija. He derived his title from a Free Patent and an Original Certificate of Title (OCT) issued in 1992. Franco asserted that his father, Pio Esguerra, had mortgaged the land to Gaudencio Miguel via a “Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase” in 1960. Before its repurchase, respondents constructed houses on the lot. Franco argued that respondents’ possession was merely by tolerance and that his father’s right to redeem had been exercised, as evidenced by a 1979 Kasunduan.
Respondents resisted the ejectment and filed a separate action for annulment of Franco’s OCT, which was consolidated with the ejectment case. They contended they had acquired ownership through open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession for over thirty years. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed the ejectment complaint and declared Franco’s OCT null and void, a decision affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE

The core issues were: (1) whether petitioner was estopped from questioning the RTC’s jurisdiction, and (2) who had a better right over the contested property.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the lower courts’ decisions. On the jurisdictional issue, the Court ruled petitioner was estopped from raising it. While jurisdiction over subject matter is conferred by law and cannot be waived, the principle of estoppel applies when a party voluntarily submits to a court’s jurisdiction and actively participates in the proceedings, only to challenge such jurisdiction after receiving an adverse judgment. Here, Franco fully participated in the trial, thereby estopping him from later contesting the RTC’s authority.
On the substantive issue, the Court upheld that respondents had acquired a vested right over the property through prescription. The evidence demonstrated their open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession for more than thirty years, which constitutes a mode of acquiring ownership under the law. This possession was in the concept of an owner, as shown by their payment of real estate taxes. Consequently, the land was no longer part of the public domain when Franco applied for the free patent. His title, derived from a patent covering land already privately owned by respondents, was therefore void. The action for reconveyance, based on this void title, had not prescribed, as prescription does not run against a void decree. The Court also found that any right of redemption under the 1960 deed had long prescribed under Article 1606 of the Civil Code.