G.R. No. 158141 ; July 11, 2006
FAUSTO R. PREYSLER, JR., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and FAR EAST ENTERPRISES, INC., respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Fausto Preysler, Jr. owns two parcels of land adjacent to but outside the Tali Beach Subdivision owned by private respondent Far East Enterprises, Inc. His properties are surrounded by the subdivision and the China Sea, making the subdivision roads his only access to the public highway. After his offer of indemnity for a right of way was refused, the respondent barricaded the access gate. Preysler filed a complaint for right of way with a prayer for a preliminary prohibitive injunction. The trial court granted the prayer and issued an original writ on December 12, 1996, ordering the removal of barricades and restraining the respondent from obstructing the petitioner’s entry and exit.
Subsequently, the petitioner used the subdivision road to transport heavy equipment and construction materials. The respondent moved to dissolve the writ, alleging violation of peaceful possession and the availability of an alternate route. The petitioner, in turn, moved for clarification. The trial court then issued an amended writ on December 29, 1998, explicitly allowing passage for the petitioner’s visitors, contractors, vehicles, equipment, and the installation of power lines. The Court of Appeals, via certiorari, set aside this amended writ and reinstated the original, more restrictive one, prompting this petition.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the amended writ of preliminary injunction which expanded the right of passage to include visitors, contractors, heavy equipment, and the installation of power lines.

RULING

The Supreme Court partially granted the petition. The legal logic centered on the nature of a preliminary injunction and the applicable provisions on easement. A preliminary injunction’s purpose is to preserve the status quo ante litem. The status quo here was the petitioner’s use of the passage before the barricade, which inherently included the means necessary for the beneficial use of his property, not merely personal ingress and egress. The amended writ, insofar as it allowed passage for visitors, guests, contractors, workers, vehicles, and materials, was a logical extension to prevent irreparable injury and was justified under Article 656 of the Civil Code, which grants a temporary easement for construction purposes upon payment of indemnity.
However, the Court ruled that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion by ordering the installation of power lines. This constitutes a permanent easement, not a temporary one covered by Article 656, and is not part of the status quo intended to be preserved by a preliminary injunction. Its installation could cause greater damage if the main case is decided against the petitioner. The case was remanded to the trial court for the proper determination of the indemnity due for the temporary easement of passage.