G.R. No. 157971 . August 31, 2005
TRISTAN LOPEZ as Attorney-in-Fact of LETICIA and CECILIA LOPEZ, Petitioners, vs. LETICIA R. FAJARDO, Respondent.

FACTS

The Sobrepenas owned an apartment unit in Manila occupied by respondent Leticia Fajardo under a verbal lease. They sold the property to the Lopez sisters, who subsequently filed an ejectment complaint (first case) against Fajardo for non-payment of rent. The parties settled, with Fajardo paying rental arrears, and the case was closed. Later, Fajardo filed a separate case to nullify the sale and assert a right of first refusal, and again failed to pay rent for July and August 2000. Petitioner Tristan Lopez, as attorney-in-fact for the Lopez sisters, sent a letter dated August 18, 2000, notifying Fajardo of the termination of the month-to-month lease effective August 31, 2000, and demanding payment and vacation of the premises.
Fajardo attempted to pay arrears and advance rentals up to July 2001, but petitioner refused acceptance, insisting on vacation by October 1, 2000. After failed barangay conciliation, petitioner filed a second ejectment complaint. The Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) ruled for petitioner, ordering ejectment. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed, but the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed, holding that the lease was not for a definite period and that ejectment could not proceed under the Rent Control Law without proving any of its enumerated grounds.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the lower courts’ decisions and ruling that petitioner had no valid cause of action for ejectment.

RULING

Yes, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the MeTC and RTC decisions. The legal logic is anchored on the nature of the lease and the application of the Civil Code and the Rent Control Law. The verbal lease, where rent was paid monthly, is considered a lease with a definite period under Article 1687 of the Civil Code. Such a month-to-month lease expires at the end of each month and can be terminated by the lessor upon proper notice to the lessee. Petitioner’s August 18, 2000 letter constituted valid notice of termination effective August 31, 2000.
The Rent Control Law’s prohibition against ejectment is not absolute; it allows ejectment upon expiration of a lease for a definite period. Since the month-to-month lease here was for a definite period, its expiration upon due notice is a valid ground for judicial ejectment under the law. The CA erred in ignoring this ground. The subsequent tender of advance rentals by Fajardo did not negate the prior valid termination. Therefore, petitioner established a lawful cause of action for ejectment based on expiration of the lease contract.