G.R. No. 157835 ; July 27, 2006
FE M. CABRERA, petitioner, vs. HON. SIMEON V. MARCELO, in his capacity as OMBUDSMAN, THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and FRANCO P. CASANOVA, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Fe M. Cabrera, former Municipal Mayor of Taal, Batangas, was charged before the Office of the Ombudsman with multiple violations of Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The charges stemmed from a Commission on Audit (COA) special audit which discovered that ten checks, issued by the municipal government as payments to various suppliers, were endorsed and deposited into the petitioner’s personal bank account. The total amount deposited was P171,955.72. Petitioner claimed she merely accommodated the suppliers’ requests to encash the checks, acting without any financial gain, and had ceased the practice to avoid any perception of impropriety.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) initially recommended the dismissal of the complaint. However, the Ombudsman disapproved this recommendation and instead found probable cause, leading to the filing of ten criminal informations against Cabrera before the Sandiganbayan. Cabrera filed a motion for reconsideration with the Ombudsman, which was denied. She then filed the present petition for certiorari under Rule 65, arguing that the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion in reversing the OSP’s finding and in maintaining the finding of probable cause against her.

ISSUE

Whether the Office of the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause to charge petitioner Fe M. Cabrera with violation of Section 3(h) of R.A. No. 3019 .

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, ruling that the Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The Court emphasized that the determination of probable cause is an executive function primarily vested in the Ombudsman, whose findings are generally not subject to judicial review absent a clear showing of grave abuse. Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
The Court found no such abuse. The Ombudsman’s act of disapproving the OSP’s recommendation and independently assessing the evidence was a valid exercise of its constitutionally mandated investigatory and prosecutorial powers. The conflict between the conclusions of the Ombudsman and the OSP does not, by itself, indicate arbitrariness. The Ombudsman’s decision, which was based on the audit findings showing petitioner’s direct financial interest in the transactions by depositing municipal checks into her personal account, was substantiated by the evidence on record. The petitioner’s reliance on the case of Roxas v. Vasquez was misplaced, as that case involved a denial of due process, a circumstance not present here. Therefore, the Court upheld the Ombudsman’s discretion and found no compelling reason to interfere with its finding of probable cause.