G.R. No. 157643 ; March 28, 2008
CRISTINELLI S. FERMIN, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS

Petitioner Cristinelli S. Fermin, the publisher, and Bogs C. Tugas, the editor-in-chief, of Gossip Tabloid were charged with libel. The criminal informations alleged that in their June 14, 1995 issue, they conspired to publish a headline and lead story falsely stating that complainant Annabelle Rama Gutierrez had misappropriated a large amount of money in the United States, had pending cases there, and was a fugitive from justice, thereby exposing her to public contempt. Upon arraignment, both pleaded not guilty.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court found both accused guilty of libel. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of petitioner Fermin but acquitted co-accused Tugas due to lack of evidence of his participation in the publication of the specific article. The CA reduced the moral damages awarded. Petitioner filed this petition, arguing she had no knowledge or participation in the article’s preparation and that the statements were protected as fair comment.

ISSUE

The primary issues are: (1) Whether a publisher can be held criminally liable for libel without proof of personal knowledge or participation in the publication of the defamatory article; and (2) Whether the published statements constitute libel or are protected as fair comment or within the realm of freedom of the press.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the CA decision. On the first issue, the Court held that Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code explicitly makes the publisher liable to the same extent as the author. This liability is not a mere disputable presumption but a substantive rule. The publisher’s role inherently involves responsibility for all content, and the defense of lack of knowledge is unavailing. Petitioner, as publisher, had the duty to oversee the publication’s content, and her failure to exercise this duty does not exonerate her. The acquittal of the editor-in-chief was based on different factual circumstances specific to his role, not on a legal principle absolving publishers.
On the second issue, the Court ruled the article was libelous. The statements imputed the commission of a crime (swindling) and depicted the complainant as a fugitive, which are defamatory per se. Malice was conclusively presumed from the defamatory character of the publication. The claim of fair comment or privileged communication fails because the statements were assertions of false facts, not mere expressions of opinion. The defense of freedom of the press does not protect the publication of knowingly false and injurious statements of fact. The penalty and modified damages were sustained as proper.