G.R. No. 156249 . March 7, 2007.
MARIANO RIVERA and JOSE RIVERA, Petitioners, vs. EMERITO AQUINO TURIANO and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF PARAÑAQUE CITY, METRO MANILA, Respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners Mariano and Jose Rivera filed a complaint to cancel an affidavit of loss annotated on TCT No. S-5667, registered in the name of Paz Aquino, and to register a real estate mortgage. The mortgage was executed by Manuel Pelaez as attorney-in-fact for Paz Aquino, pursuant to a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) dated January 29, 1987, to secure a loan from the Riveras. The SPA was not annotated, but Pelaez delivered the owner’s duplicate certificate of title to the Riveras. In 1991, when the Riveras sought to register the mortgage, they discovered that respondent Emerito Turiano, Paz Aquino’s son, had executed and registered an affidavit of loss for the title in 1990 after Paz’s death, prompting the Register of Deeds to refuse the mortgage registration.
Turiano claimed the SPA in favor of Pelaez was a forgery, asserting his mother had executed SPAs only for other entities in 1986, which were duly annotated. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted partial summary judgment, declared the affidavit of loss null and void, and ordered the Register of Deeds to cancel its annotation and register the mortgage. The RTC found the SPA was sufficiently proven and that Turiano failed to prove forgery by clear evidence.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the RTC and declaring the SPA and the subsequent mortgage null and void based on a finding of forgery.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the RTC decision. The Court held that forgery must be proved by clear, positive, and convincing evidence, and the burden of proof lies with the party alleging it. The CA relied primarily on a comparison of signatures, finding variance between Paz Aquino’s signature on the disputed SPA and those on other documents presented by Turiano. However, the Supreme Court emphasized that mere variance of signatures is not conclusive proof of forgery.
The Court outlined the requisite proof: (1) the disputed signature must be inconsistent with the genuine signatures; (2) the inconsistency must be due to a different personality, not merely an inevitable variation in the genuine writing of the same writer; and (3) any resemblance must result from skillful imitation, not a habitual characteristic. Turiano’s evidence, consisting of signatures from documents dated 1972, 1982, and 1986, was insufficient. The significant time gaps between these signatures could account for natural variations. Without clear and convincing evidence meeting the established standards, the allegation of forgery fails. Thus, the SPA and the mortgage executed pursuant to it are valid.