G.R. No. 156100 . September 12, 2007.
VILMA E. ROMAGOS, petitioner, vs. METRO CEBU WATER DISTRICT, EDITHA D. LUZANO and DULCE M. ABANILLA, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Vilma E. Romagos, a Clerk-Processor B at Metro Cebu Water District (MCWD), was barred from entering work on August 9, 1999, and required to undergo psychiatric treatment. By a letter dated December 1, 1999, MCWD informed her she was being dropped from the rolls effective January 1, 2000, due to mental incapacity. The letter cited specific incident reports from January and August 1999 detailing her disruptive and incoherent behavior, and certifications from 1989 and 1991 diagnosing her with Major Depression. Romagos appealed to the Civil Service Commission Regional Office (CSCRO).
The CSCRO dismissed her appeal, relying not only on the evidence cited in the December 1 letter but also on new evidence—affidavits and memoranda regarding her alleged abnormal behavior in September and December 1999—submitted by MCWD during the proceedings. Romagos moved for reconsideration, arguing it was a violation of due process to consider this new evidence, as it was never disclosed to her in the notice of separation. The CSCRO and, subsequently, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) proper, denied her appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the CSC resolutions.

ISSUE

Whether the dropping of Romagos from the rolls was effected with due process.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court granted the petition and reversed the assailed decisions. The legal logic is anchored on the fundamental requirement of due process in administrative proceedings, which demands that an employee be informed of the charges against them and be given an opportunity to present their side. The Court held that while an employer may drop an employee from the rolls for physical or mental incapacity under Civil Service rules, this action must comply with due process. The notice of separation must contain a statement of the specific causes or incidents constituting the incapacity.
In this case, MCWD’s December 1, 1999 letter validly initiated the proceeding by stating the incidents from January and August 1999 and the medical certifications. However, the CSCRO and CSC violated Romagos’s right to due process by affirming her dismissal based on additional incidents from September and December 1999, which were not included in that notice. These new grounds were never communicated to her, depriving her of the opportunity to refute them. Due process requires that the decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the notice and disclosed to the employee. A decision based on undisclosed evidence is void. Consequently, the Court ordered Romagos’s reinstatement and the payment of backwages.