G.R. No. 156052 , March 7, 2007
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T. CABIGAO, and BONIFACIO S. TUMBOKON, Petitioners, vs. HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila, Respondent.

FACTS

On November 28, 2001, Manila Mayor Jose Atienza, Jr. approved Ordinance No. 8027, which reclassified the Pandacan area from Industrial II to Commercial I to promote public safety and welfare. The ordinance expressly required owners or operators of disallowed businesses, including the large oil terminals of Caltex, Petron, and Shell, to cease operations within six months from its effectivity on December 28, 2001. However, on June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the oil companies, agreeing to a “scale down” of the terminals instead of their removal. The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified this MOU through Resolution No. 97, later extending its effectivity.
Petitioners, the Social Justice Society and concerned citizens, filed an original petition for mandamus to compel Mayor Atienza to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the immediate removal of the oil terminals. They argued the Mayor has a clear ministerial duty under the Local Government Code to enforce all city ordinances. Respondent Mayor defended his inaction by claiming the MOU and the subsequent resolutions effectively modified or suspended the ordinance, creating a new operational framework for the terminals.

ISSUE

The primary issue is whether respondent Mayor Atienza has a clear, ministerial duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027, such that mandamus lies to compel him to execute it and order the removal of the Pandacan oil terminals.

RULING

Yes, the Supreme Court granted the petition for mandamus. The Court held that the duty of a local chief executive to enforce all laws and ordinances, as prescribed under Section 455(b)(2) of the Local Government Code, is ministerial. A ministerial duty is one which is so clear and specific as to leave no room for the exercise of discretion. Ordinance No. 8027, a validly enacted law, imposed a clear mandate: the disallowed businesses must cease operations within six months. The Mayor’s role was purely to execute this legislative will.
The Court ruled that the subsequent MOU and Sanggunian resolutions could not amend, repeal, or negate the ordinance. An ordinance is a law; it can only be repealed or amended by another ordinance of equal dignity, following the prescribed legislative process. A memorandum of understanding and mere resolutions do not have the force of law and cannot override a legislative enactment. Therefore, the MOU did not absolve the Mayor of his statutory duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027. His refusal to perform this duty, based on the invalid MOU, constituted unlawful neglect warranting the writ of mandamus. The Court ordered him to immediately enforce the ordinance.