G.R. No. 154674 ; May 27, 2004
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, petitioner, vs. FELICISIMO O. JOSON, JR., in his capacity as former Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), respondent.

FACTS

Respondent Felicisimo O. Joson, Jr., then POEA Administrator, appointed Priscilla Ong as Executive Assistant IV on July 1, 1995, to a newly created contractual position approved by the DBM. Ong lacked the required college degree. Joson requested CSC exemption from this qualification, which the CSC granted via Resolution No. 956978 dated November 2, 1995, approving the appointment under a “Coterminous Temporary” status. However, a CSC post-audit subsequently invalidated the original July 1, 1995 appointment and changed its effectivity to November 2, 1995.
Joson then requested CSC approval for payment of Ong’s salary for services rendered from July 1 to October 31, 1995. The CSC denied the request in Resolution No. 974094, citing R.A. No. 7430 (Attrition Law), which prohibits filling a vacancy without prior CSC authority. The CSC argued that since authority was granted only on November 2, 1995, payment for the prior period was disallowed. It further held Joson personally liable for the salary under CSC rules, as the appointing authority for a disapproved appointment.

ISSUE

Whether the Civil Service Commission correctly held respondent Joson personally liable for the salary of Priscilla Ong for the period July 1 to October 31, 1995.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court reversed the CSC and held Joson not personally liable. The legal logic is anchored on the nature of Ong’s appointment and the principle against unjust enrichment. Ong’s appointment was to a confidential, coterminous position within the non-career service. The Court emphasized that appointments to such personal and confidential staff positions are exempt from the prior authority requirement of R.A. No. 7430 , as the law explicitly applies only to positions in the first and second levels of the career service. Since the position was newly created, confidential, and coterminous, the prohibition did not apply, making the appointment essentially valid from its original date.
Consequently, Ong rendered services in good faith under a color of appointment later validated by the CSC, and the government (POEA) benefited from her work. To deny her compensation would constitute unjust enrichment at her expense. The principle of quantum meruit demands that the entity receiving the benefit—the POEA—should pay for the services. Personal liability of the appointing authority under CSC rules attaches only for appointments disapproved due to violations of law. Here, no such violation existed, as the appointment was ultimately approved and the prior authority rule was inapplicable. Therefore, the obligation to pay Ong’s salary falls upon the POEA, not Joson personally.